Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Rod Girle and Richard Cartwright

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
9786 Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
9784 A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1813 All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1815 Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1812 All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
1811 Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
7798 There are three axiom schemas for propositional logic [Girle]
7786 Propositional logic handles negation, disjunction, conjunction; predicate logic adds quantifiers, predicates, relations [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
7799 Proposition logic has definitions for its three operators: or, and, and identical [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
7797 Axiom systems of logic contain axioms, inference rules, and definitions of proof and theorems [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
7794 There are seven modalities in S4, each with its negation [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
7793 ◊p → □◊p is the hallmark of S5 [Girle]
7795 S5 has just six modalities, and all strings can be reduced to those [Girle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
7787 Possible worlds logics use true-in-a-world rather than true [Girle]
7796 Modal logics were studied in terms of axioms, but now possible worlds semantics is added [Girle]
7788 Modal logic has four basic modal negation equivalences [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
7789 Necessary implication is called 'strict implication'; if successful, it is called 'entailment' [Girle]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
7790 If an argument is invalid, a truth tree will indicate a counter-example [Girle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
9783 While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
14961 Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R]
14962 Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13952 Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
13954 The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
13955 Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
13953 An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
7800 Analytic truths are divided into logically and conceptually necessary [Girle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
7801 Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
7792 A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8850 Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1814 Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]