Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Max Weber and George Molnar

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55 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
There is no objectivity in social sciences - only viewpoints for selecting and organising data [Weber]
The results of social research can be true, and not just subjectively valid for one person [Weber]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
Nature requires causal explanations, but society requires clarification by reasons and motives [Weber, by Critchley]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
We are disenchanted because we rely on science, which ignores values [Weber, by Boulter]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The idea of duty in one's calling haunts us, like a lost religion [Weber]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Domination is probable obedience by some group of persons [Weber]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Acquisition and low consumption lead to saving, investment, and increased wealth [Weber]
When asceticism emerged from the monasteries, it helped to drive the modern economy [Weber]
Capitalism is not unlimited greed, and may even be opposed to greed [Weber]
Modern western capitalism has free labour, business separate from household, and book-keeping [Weber]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Punish the heretic, but be indulgent to the sinner [Weber]