88 ideas
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
1813 | All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1815 | Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1812 | All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
1811 | Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22062 | Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte] |
22015 | The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
8850 | Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
1814 | Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius] |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |