Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, G.E.M. Anscombe and Charles Taylor

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34 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
Freedom involves acting according to an idea [Anscombe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
To believe in determinism, one must believe in a system which determines events [Anscombe]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
Intentional actions are those which are explained by giving the reason for so acting [Anscombe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
It would be better to point to failings of character, than to moral wrongness of actions [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe]
Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The social contract sees society as constituted by and for individuals [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Assigning a right based on a human capacity implies that the capacity should be developed [Taylor,C]
If freedom depends on society and culture, the greatest freedom is in shaping them [Taylor,C]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
Our reliance on other people close to us does not imply any political obligations [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is not just a rule, but also asserts certain ideas of moral worth [Taylor,C]
For most people the primacy of rights mainly concerns freedom [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property is not essential for life, but it may be essential for independence [Taylor,C]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
If the state is neutral, there won't be sufficient community to support a welfare state [Taylor,C, by Kymlicka]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
With diseases we easily trace a cause from an effect, but we cannot predict effects [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
The word 'cause' is an abstraction from a group of causal terms in a language (scrape, push..) [Anscombe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Since Mill causation has usually been explained by necessary and sufficient conditions [Anscombe]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]