Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Friend/Kimpton-Nye and D.J. O'Connor

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29 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Humeans see properties as having no more essential features and relations than their distinctness [Friend/Kimpton-Nye, by PG]
Dispositions are what individuate properties, and they constitute their essence [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Powers are properties which necessitate dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Dispositional essentialism (unlike the grounding view) says only fundamental properties are powers [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
A power is a property which consists entirely of dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Powers are qualitative properties which fully ground dispositions [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor]
Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Hume's Dictum says no connections are necessary - so mass and spacetime warping could separate [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]