Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Carrie Jenkins and James O. Young

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins]
Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins]
The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO]
Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 1. Analytic Propositions
'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins]