Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Victor Velarde-Mayol and Tim Mawson

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5 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
     Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
     From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
     A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representation may not be a likeness [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Representationalism is the doctrine that maintains that the object is represented in consciousness by means of an image. ...One should not confuse an image with a likeness.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 2.4.3)
     A reaction: Helpful reminder that sense-data or whatever may not be a likeness. But then how do they represent? Symbolic representation needs massive interpretation.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights are moral significance, or liberty, or right not to be restrained, or entitlement [Mawson]
     Full Idea: A 'right' can mean 'x counts morally', or 'x is permitted to do this' (liberty), or 'x can't be stopped from doing this' (negative right), or 'someone should provide this for x'.
     From: Tim Mawson (Animal Rights talk [2003]), quoted by PG - lecture notes
     A reaction: A useful analysis. It is a useful preliminary to considering whether any of these are natural rights. Personally I am sympathetic to that concept. You cannot deny a person's right to self-defence, even when you are sitting on them. Persons have rights.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Find the essence by varying an object, to see what remains invariable [Velarde-Mayol]
     Full Idea: Eidetic Reduction consists of producing variations in the individual object until we see what is invariable in it. What is invariable is its essence or Eidos.
     From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 3.2.2)
     A reaction: This strikes me as an excellent idea. It more or less describes the method of science. Chemical atoms were thought to be unsplittable, until someone tried a new variation for dealing with them.