Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Thomas Jefferson and Jonathan Barnes

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5 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

12887	A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
	Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
	From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
	A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique

9073	Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J]
	Full Idea: The procedure of abstraction will not allow us to distinguish the ambiguity between 'mole' as an animal and as an artefact. The stages of abstraction will only end up with 'physical object', and this will then count as the definition.
	From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7)
	A reaction: This is a problem if you adhere to a rather precise account of the steps of abstraction, with every stage explicit (and probably expressed in terms of sets), but I suspect that the real tangle of semi-conscious abstraction avoids this problem.

9074	Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J]
	Full Idea: Abstractions cannot account for those general terms whose instances do not have any set of features in common. The word 'game' is not ambiguous, but not all games have one thing in common; they are united by looser 'family resemblance'.
	From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7)
	A reaction: (This point comes from Wittgenstein, Idea 4141) English-speakers can't agree on borderline cases (avoiding cracks in pavements). Life is just a game. The objection would be refuted by discussion of higher-level abstractions to make connections.

9072	Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J]
	Full Idea: If we create abstractions by collection of attributes common to groups of entities, we will collect far too many attributes, and wrongly put them into the definition (such as 'having hairless palms' when identifying 'men').
	From: Jonathan Barnes (Commentary on 'Posterior Analytics [1993], n to 97b7)
	A reaction: [compressed] Defining 'man' is a hugely complex business (see Idea 1763!), unlike defining 'hair' or 'red'. Some attributes will strike perceivers immediately, but absence of an attribute is not actually 'perceived' at all.

24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / b. Natural equality

20565	Men are created equal, and with certain inalienable rights [Jefferson]
	Full Idea: We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.
	From: Thomas Jefferson (U.S. Declaration of Independence [1775]), quoted by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.4
	A reaction: In the context, saying equality and rights are 'natural' is just a way of saying we will fight to the death to defend them. The big modern problem for the U.S. is that nominal equality before the law doesn't ensure equality in society.