10 ideas
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics. | |
| From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2 | |
| A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases. |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
| A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1) | |
| A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination? |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
| 19508 | Contextualism needs a semantics for knowledge sentences that are partly indexical [Schiffer,S] |
| Full Idea: Contextualist semantics must capture the 'indexical' nature of knowledge claims, the fact that different utterances of a knowledge sentence with no apparent indexical terms can express different propositions. | |
| From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.325), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5 | |
| A reaction: Schiffer tries to show that this is too difficult, and DeRose defends contextualism against the charge. |
| 19509 | The indexical aspect of contextual knowledge might be hidden, or it might be in what 'know' means [Schiffer,S] |
| Full Idea: One might have a 'hidden-indexical' theory of knowledge sentences: they contain constituents that are not the semantic values of any terms; ...or 'to know' itself might be indexical, as in 'I know[easy] I have hands' or 'I know[tough] I have hands'. | |
| From: Stephen Schiffer (Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism [1996], p.326-7), quoted by Keith DeRose - The Case for Contextualism 1.5 | |
| A reaction: [very compressed] Given the choice, I would have thought it was in 'know', since to say 'either you know p or you don't' sounds silly to me. |