Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Robert B. Brandom and Myles F. Burnyeat

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4 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts

10355	Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch]
	Full Idea: Brandom says that facts do not make claims true, because facts simply are true claims.
	From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Making It Explicit [1994], p.327) by Martin Kusch - Knowledge by Agreement Ch.18
	A reaction: Nice. Notoriously, anyone defending the correspondence theory of truth in terms of facts had better say what they mean by a 'fact'. Personally I take a fact to be a non-verbal, mind-independent situation in the world, so I disagree with Brandom.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

12887	A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
	Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
	From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
	A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use

7765	The use of a sentence is its commitments and entitlements [Brandom, by Lycan]
	Full Idea: Brandom develops a particular conception of 'use', according to which a sentence's use is the set of commitments and entitlements associated with public utterance of that sentence.
	From: report of Robert B. Brandom (Articulating Reasons: Intro to Inferentialism [2000]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.6
	A reaction: It immediately strikes me that a sentence could only have commitments and entitlements if it already had a meaning. However, the case of money shows how there might be nothing more to a thing's significance than its entitlements.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism

4377	Intellectualism is an excessive emphasis on reasoning in moral philosophy [Burnyeat]
	Full Idea: Intellectualism, a one-sided preoccupation with reason and reasoning, is a perennial failing in moral philosophy.
	From: Myles F. Burnyeat (Aristotle on Learning to be Good [1980], p.70)
	A reaction: But Kant's reply would be that while there is much more to moral behaviour, the only part which matters in morality is the reasoning part. And Socrates' view (ignorance is evil) is not obviously wrong.