46 ideas
| 1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: He studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgement on all points. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.3 | |
| A reaction: In what sense was Pyrrho a philosopher, then? He must have asserted SOME generalised judgments. |
| 1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The Sceptics say that they only employ reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason, without employing reason. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8 |
| 22289 | Dedekind proved definition by recursion, and thus proved the basic laws of arithmetic [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Dedkind gave a rigorous proof of the principle of definition by recursion, permitting recursive definitions of addition and multiplication, and hence proofs of the familiar arithmetical laws. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 13 'Deriv' |
| 10183 | An infinite set maps into its own proper subset [Dedekind, by Reck/Price] |
| Full Idea: A set is 'Dedekind-infinite' iff there exists a one-to-one function that maps a set into a proper subset of itself. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], §64) by E Reck / M Price - Structures and Structuralism in Phil of Maths n 7 | |
| A reaction: Sounds as if it is only infinite if it is contradictory, or doesn't know how big it is! |
| 22288 | We have the idea of self, and an idea of that idea, and so on, so infinite ideas are available [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind had an interesting proof of the Axiom of Infinity. He held that I have an a priori grasp of the idea of my self, and that every idea I can form the idea of that idea. Hence there are infinitely many objects available to me a priori. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], no. 66) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 12 'Numb' | |
| A reaction: Who said that Descartes' Cogito was of no use? Frege endorsed this, as long as the ideas are objective and not subjective. |
| 10706 | Dedekind originally thought more in terms of mereology than of sets [Dedekind, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind plainly had fusions, not collections, in mind when he avoided the empty set and used the same symbol for membership and inclusion - two tell-tale signs of a mereological conception. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], 2-3) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 02.1 | |
| A reaction: Potter suggests that mathematicians were torn between mereology and sets, and eventually opted whole-heartedly for sets. Maybe this is only because set theory was axiomatised by Zermelo some years before Lezniewski got to mereology. |
| 9823 | Numbers are free creations of the human mind, to understand differences [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: Numbers are free creations of the human mind; they serve as a means of apprehending more easily and more sharply the difference of things. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], Pref) | |
| A reaction: Does this fit real numbers and complex numbers, as well as natural numbers? Frege was concerned by the lack of objectivity in this sort of view. What sort of arithmetic might the Martians have created? Numbers register sameness too. |
| 10090 | Dedekind defined the integers, rationals and reals in terms of just the natural numbers [Dedekind, by George/Velleman] |
| Full Idea: It was primarily Dedekind's accomplishment to define the integers, rationals and reals, taking only the system of natural numbers for granted. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Intro |
| 17452 | Ordinals can define cardinals, as the smallest ordinal that maps the set [Dedekind, by Heck] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind and Cantor said the cardinals may be defined in terms of the ordinals: The cardinal number of a set S is the least ordinal onto whose predecessors the members of S can be mapped one-one. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Richard G. Heck - Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity 5 |
| 7524 | Order, not quantity, is central to defining numbers [Dedekind, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind said that the notion of order, rather than that of quantity, is the central notion in the definition of number. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: Compare Aristotle's nice question in Idea 646. My intuition is that quantity comes first, because I'm not sure HOW you could count, if you didn't think you were changing the quantity each time. Why does counting go in THAT particular order? Cf. Idea 8661. |
| 14131 | Dedekind's ordinals are just members of any progression whatever [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind's ordinals are not essentially either ordinals or cardinals, but the members of any progression whatever. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §243 | |
| A reaction: This is part of Russell's objection to Dedekind's structuralism. The question is always why these beautiful structures should actually be considered as numbers. I say, unlike Russell, that the connection to counting is crucial. |
| 17611 | We want the essence of continuity, by showing its origin in arithmetic [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: It then only remained to discover its true origin in the elements of arithmetic and thus at the same time to secure a real definition of the essence of continuity. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He seeks the origin of the theorem that differential calculus deals with continuous magnitude, and he wants an arithmetical rather than geometrical demonstration; the result is his famous 'cut']. |
| 10572 | A cut between rational numbers creates and defines an irrational number [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: Whenever we have to do a cut produced by no rational number, we create a new, an irrational number, which we regard as completely defined by this cut. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], §4) | |
| A reaction: Fine quotes this to show that the Dedekind Cut creates the irrational numbers, rather than hitting them. A consequence is that the irrational numbers depend on the rational numbers, and so can never be identical with any of them. See Idea 10573. |
| 14437 | Dedekind's axiom that his Cut must be filled has the advantages of theft over honest toil [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind set up the axiom that the gap in his 'cut' must always be filled …The method of 'postulating' what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil. Let us leave them to others. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Bertrand Russell - Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy VII | |
| A reaction: This remark of Russell's is famous, and much quoted in other contexts, but I have seen the modern comment that it is grossly unfair to Dedekind. |
| 18094 | Dedekind says each cut matches a real; logicists say the cuts are the reals [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: One view, favoured by Dedekind, is that the cut postulates a real number for each cut in the rationals; it does not identify real numbers with cuts. ....A view favoured by later logicists is simply to identify a real number with a cut. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.4 | |
| A reaction: Dedekind is the patriarch of structuralism about mathematics, so he has little interest in the existenc of 'objects'. |
| 18244 | I say the irrational is not the cut itself, but a new creation which corresponds to the cut [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: Of my theory of irrationals you say that the irrational number is nothing else than the cut itself, whereas I prefer to create something new (different from the cut), which corresponds to the cut. We have the right to claim such a creative power. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Letter to Weber [1888], 1888 Jan), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 5.4 | |
| A reaction: Clearly a cut will not locate a unique irrational number, so something more needs to be done. Shapiro remarks here that for Dedekind numbers are objects. |
| 9824 | In counting we see the human ability to relate, correspond and represent [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: If we scrutinize closely what is done in counting an aggregate of things, we see the ability of the mind to relate things to things, to let a thing correspond to a thing, or to represent a thing by a thing, without which no thinking is possible. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], Pref) | |
| A reaction: I don't suppose it occurred to Dedekind that he was reasserting Hume's observation about the fundamental psychology of thought. Is the origin of our numerical ability of philosophical interest? |
| 17612 | Arithmetic is just the consequence of counting, which is the successor operation [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: I regard the whole of arithmetic as a necessary, or at least natural, consequence of the simplest arithmetic act, that of counting, and counting itself is nothing else than the successive creation of the infinite series of positive integers. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], §1) | |
| A reaction: Thus counting roots arithmetic in the world, the successor operation is the essence of counting, and the Dedekind-Peano axioms are built around successors, and give the essence of arithmetic. Unfashionable now, but I love it. Intransitive counting? |
| 9826 | A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: A system S is said to be infinite when it is similar to a proper part of itself. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], V.64) |
| 18087 | If x changes by less and less, it must approach a limit [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: If in the variation of a magnitude x we can for every positive magnitude δ assign a corresponding position from and after which x changes by less than δ then x approaches a limiting value. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Continuity and Irrational Numbers [1872], p.27), quoted by Philip Kitcher - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge 10.7 | |
| A reaction: [Kitcher says he 'showed' this, rather than just stating it] |
| 13508 | Dedekind gives a base number which isn't a successor, then adds successors and induction [Dedekind, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind's natural numbers: an object is in a set (0 is a number), a function sends the set one-one into itself (numbers have unique successors), the object isn't a value of the function (it isn't a successor), plus induction. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 5 | |
| A reaction: Hart notes that since this refers to sets of individuals, it is a second-order account of numbers, what we now call 'Second-Order Peano Arithmetic'. |
| 18096 | Zero is a member, and all successors; numbers are the intersection of sets satisfying this [Dedekind, by Bostock] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind's idea is that the set of natural numbers has zero as a member, and also has as a member the successor of each of its members, and it is the smallest set satisfying this condition. It is the intersection of all sets satisfying the condition. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 4.4 |
| 18841 | Categoricity implies that Dedekind has characterised the numbers, because it has one domain [Rumfitt on Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: It is Dedekind's categoricity result that convinces most of us that he has articulated our implicit conception of the natural numbers, since it entitles us to speak of 'the' domain (in the singular, up to isomorphism) of natural numbers. | |
| From: comment on Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Ian Rumfitt - The Boundary Stones of Thought 9.1 | |
| A reaction: The main rival is set theory, but that has an endlessly expanding domain. He points out that Dedekind needs second-order logic to achieve categoricity. Rumfitt says one could also add to the 1st-order version that successor is an ancestral relation. |
| 14130 | Induction is proved in Dedekind, an axiom in Peano; the latter seems simpler and clearer [Dedekind, by Russell] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind proves mathematical induction, while Peano regards it as an axiom, ...and Peano's method has the advantage of simplicity, and a clearer separation between the particular and the general propositions of arithmetic. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Bertrand Russell - The Principles of Mathematics §241 |
| 8924 | Dedekind originated the structuralist conception of mathematics [Dedekind, by MacBride] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind is the philosopher-mathematician with whom the structuralist conception originates. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], §3 n13) by Fraser MacBride - Structuralism Reconsidered | |
| A reaction: Hellman says the idea grew naturally out of modern mathematics, and cites Hilbert's belief that furniture would do as mathematical objects. |
| 9153 | Dedekindian abstraction talks of 'positions', where Cantorian abstraction talks of similar objects [Dedekind, by Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: Dedekindian abstraction says mathematical objects are 'positions' in a model, while Cantorian abstraction says they are the result of abstracting on structurally similar objects. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Kit Fine - Cantorian Abstraction: Recon. and Defence §6 | |
| A reaction: The key debate among structuralists seems to be whether or not they are committed to 'objects'. Fine rejects the 'austere' version, which says that objects have no properties. Either version of structuralism can have abstraction as its basis. |
| 9825 | A thing is completely determined by all that can be thought concerning it [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: A thing (an object of our thought) is completely determined by all that can be affirmed or thought concerning it. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], I.1) | |
| A reaction: How could you justify this as an observation? Why can't there be unthinkable things (even by God)? Presumably Dedekind is offering a stipulative definition, but we may then be confusing epistemology with ontology. |
| 12887 | A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim] |
| Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics. | |
| From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2 | |
| A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases. |
| 6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: Against the Stoics, the Pyrrhonians argued that if someone presents a criterion of truth, then it will be important to determine whether it is the correct criterion. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: Hence Davidson says that attempts to define truth are 'folly'. If something has to be taken as basic, then truth seems a good candidate (since, for example, logical operators could not otherwise be defined by means of 'truth' tables). |
| 6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: The attacks of the Pyrrhonian sceptics are directed against the dogmas of the 'professors', not against the beliefs of the common people pursuing the business of daily life. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: This may be because they thought that ordinary people were too confused to be worth attacking, rather than because they lived in a state of beautifully appropriate beliefs. Naïve realism is certainly worth attacking. |
| 6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| Full Idea: The ancient Academic sceptics charged the Pyrrhonian sceptics with 'negative dogmatism' when they claimed that a certain kind of knowledge is impossible. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4 | |
| A reaction: It is this kind of point which should push us towards some sort of rationalism, because certain a priori 'dogmas' seem to be indispensable to get any sort of discussion off the ground. The only safe person is Cratylus (see Idea 578). |
| 1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fifth mode: judgements vary according to local custom, law and culture (Persians marry their daughters). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Third mode: things like an apple vary according to which sense perceives them (yellow, sweet, and fragrant). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Seventh mode: perception varies according to viewing distance and angle (the sun, and a dove's neck). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Tenth mode: perceptions and judgements depend on comparison (light/heavy, above/below). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Second mode: individual men vary in responses and feelings (heat and cold, for example). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: First mode: animals vary in their feelings and judgements (of food, for example). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Fourth mode: perceivers vary in their mental and physical state (such as the mad and the sick). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Eighth mode: perceptions of things depend on their magnitude or quantity (food and wine). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Sixth mode: the perception of an object depends on surrounding conditions (sunlight and lamplight). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Ninth mode: we perceive things according to what we expect (earthquakes and sunshine). | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.9 |
| 9189 | Dedekind said numbers were abstracted from systems of objects, leaving only their position [Dedekind, by Dummett] |
| Full Idea: By applying the operation of abstraction to a system of objects isomorphic to the natural numbers, Dedekind believed that we obtained the abstract system of natural numbers, each member having only properties consequent upon its position. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics | |
| A reaction: Dummett is scornful of the abstractionism. He cites Benacerraf as a modern non-abstractionist follower of Dedekind's view. There seems to be a suspicion of circularity in it. How many objects will you abstract from to get seven? |
| 9827 | We derive the natural numbers, by neglecting everything of a system except distinctness and order [Dedekind] |
| Full Idea: If in an infinite system, set in order, we neglect the special character of the elements, simply retaining their distinguishability and their order-relations to one another, then the elements are the natural numbers, created by the human mind. | |
| From: Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888], VI.73) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is the classic abstractionist view of the origin of number, but with the added feature that the order is first imposed, so that ordinals remain after the abstraction. This, of course, sounds a bit circular, as well as subjective. |
| 9979 | Dedekind has a conception of abstraction which is not psychologistic [Dedekind, by Tait] |
| Full Idea: Dedekind's conception is psychologistic only if that is the only way to understand the abstraction that is involved, which it is not. | |
| From: report of Richard Dedekind (Nature and Meaning of Numbers [1888]) by William W. Tait - Frege versus Cantor and Dedekind IV | |
| A reaction: This is a very important suggestion, implying that we can retain some notion of abstractionism, while jettisoning the hated subjective character of private psychologism, which seems to undermine truth and logic. |
| 3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: The idea of cause is relative to that of which it is the cause, and so has no real existence. …Also cause must either be body causing body, or incorporeal causing incorporeal, and neither of these is possible. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |
| 3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Motion is not moved in the place in which it is is, and it is impossible that it should be moved in the place in which it is not, so there is no such thing as motion. | |
| From: report of Pyrrho (reports [c.325 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.11.11 |