Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Matthew Cobb and R Martin / J Barresi

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7 ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

12887	A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
	Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
	From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
	A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain

23226	There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb]
	Full Idea: Researchers have recently described a single inhibitory neuron in a region called the visual thalamus of the mouse - it has 862 input synapses and 626 output synapses.
	From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], 11)
	A reaction: This is the kind of fact which philosophers of mind must be aware of when offering accounts of thought which are in danger of being simplistic.

23216	The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb]
	Full Idea: A number of scientists are now realising that, by viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds ot inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of the body intervening in the world.
	From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], Intro)
	A reaction: I like any idea which reminds us that nature is intrinsically active, and not merely passive. Laws are in nature, not imposed on it. My preferred ontology, based on powers as fundamental, applies to the brain, as well as to physics. No free will needed.

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

5504	Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.

5503	Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

5502	Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
	A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

5505	For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
	A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.