Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Giles of Orleans and John Greco

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5 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco]
     Full Idea: Intuitively, understanding is more valuable than knowledge and wisdom is more valuable than understanding.
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], 'Knowledge')
     A reaction: Down at the bottom is having an 'inkling' of something, I presume. Not convinced of this. I would rate understanding above knowledge, but wisdom seems rather different. It implies a breadth that does not focus on any particular topic.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
     Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
     From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
     A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans]
     Full Idea: Every alteration in secondary qualities is caused by some alteration made in the primary qualities.
     From: Giles of Orleans (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1270], I.6c)
     A reaction: Pasnau calls this the 'supervenience' thesis, here with the addition of causation. Was this doctrine retained by Locke and Boyle?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
     Full Idea: Why should knowledge be more valuable than true opinion, if their practical value is the same?
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: We have exam systems and academic titles to bestow social prestige on people who know, not to mention quiz shows. Modern society needs lots of knowledgeable citizens. I'm not sure what intrinsic value knowledge could have.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
     Full Idea: Externalist theories do not give knowledge the sort of value that internalists want knowledge to have.
     From: John Greco (The Value Problem [2011], Intro)
     A reaction: [He cites Pritchard 2008] This is not a very strong argument, given the uncertainties and complexities in the idea that we share a 'value'. If the value of knowledge is really instrumental (and loved no less because of that), then externalism could cope.