Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, G.F. Stout and Keith DeRose

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8 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8511 Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
     Full Idea: In modern times, it was G.F. Stout who first explicitly made the proposal that properties and relations are as particular as the substances that they qualify.
     From: report of G.F. Stout (The Nature of Universals and Propositions [1923]) by Keith Campbell - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars §1
     A reaction: Note that relations will have to be tropes, as well as properties. Williams wants tropes to be parts of objects, but that will be tricky with relations. If you place two objects on a table, how does the 'to the left of' trope come into existence?
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
12887 A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
     Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
     From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
     A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
19513 A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
     Full Idea: If you are a coherentist and a contextualist, you'll probably want to hold that how strongly beliefs must cohere with one another in order to count as knowledge (if they are true), or to count as justified, is a contextually variable matter.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.09)
     A reaction: How exciting! He's talking about ME! Context might not only dictate the strength of the coherence, but also the range of beliefs involved. In fact all of Thagard's criteria of coherence may be subject to contextual variation.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19514 Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
     Full Idea: The great rival to contextualism is classical 'invariantism' - invariantism about the truth-conditions [for knowing], combined with variable standards for warranted assertability.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.12)
     A reaction: That is, I take it, that we might want to assert that someone 'knows' something, when the truth is that they don't. That is, either you know or you don't, but we can bend the rules as to whether we say you know. I take this view to be false.
19515 We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
     Full Idea: We might make the basic contextualist schema more precise ...by saying the change in content will consist in a change in the range of relevant alternatives. Higher standards would discriminate from a broader range of alternatives.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.14)
     A reaction: This would handle the 'fake barn' and 'disguised zebra' examples, by saying lower standards do not expect such discriminations. The zebra case has a lower standard than the barn case (because fake barns are the norm here).
19510 In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
     Full Idea: I'm inclined to accept that in certain contexts the standards for knowledge are so low that little more than true belief is required.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.6)
     A reaction: DeRose emphasises that 'a little more' is needed, rather than none. The example given is where 'he knew that p' means little more than 'the information that p was available to him' (in a political scandal).
19516 Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
     Full Idea: While skepticism has drawn much of the attention of contextualists, support for contextualism should also - and perhaps primarily - be looked for in how 'knows' is utilised in non-philosophical conversation.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1016)
     A reaction: Contextualists say scepticism is just raising the standards absurdly high. I take it that the ordinary use of the word 'know' is obviously highly contextual, and so varied that I don't see how philosophers could 'regiment' it into invariant form.
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19511 If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
     Full Idea: Maybe contextualism isn't a theory about knowledge at all, but about knowledge attributions. As such, it is not a piece of epistemology at all, but of philosophy of language.
     From: Keith DeRose (The Case for Contextualism [2009], 1.7)
     A reaction: DeRose takes this view to be wrong. At the very least this will have to include self-attributions, by the supposed knower, because I might say 'I know that p', meaning 'but only in this rather low-standard context'.