12887
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A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
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Full Idea:
A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
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From:
Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
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A reaction:
Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.
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14494
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Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
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A reaction:
Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
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3398
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Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
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A reaction:
An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
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