Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Anjan Chakravarrty and Friedrich Jacobi

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9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

15148	Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Powers explain behaviours regardless of whether they are necessary for membership in a particular class of things.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
	A reaction: This seems right, and is important for driving a wedge between powers and essences. If there are essences, they are not simply some bunch of powers.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

12887	A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
	Full Idea: A whole must possess an attribute peculiar to and characteristic of it as a whole; there must be a characteristic relation of dependence between the parts; and the whole must have some structure which gives it characteristics.
	From: Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P (Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts [1955], p.90), quoted by Peter Simons - Parts 9.2
	A reaction: Simons says these are basically sensible conditions, and tries to fill them out. They seem a pretty good start, and I must resist the temptation to rush to borderline cases.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

15145	A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: The modern concept of a kind essence is a set of intrinsic properties that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the membership of something in a class of things, or 'kind'.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: I am always struck by the problem that the kind itself is constructed from the individuals, so circularity always seems to loom.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

15147	Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

15144	Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Scientific practices such as prediction and explanation regarding causal phenomena are concerned not merely with kinds having essences, but also with kinds lacking them.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 1)
	A reaction: Not quite clear what he has in mind, but explanation should certainly involve a coherent picture, and not just the citation of some underlying causal mechanism.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation

7071	Life and rationality are pointless if we can only contemplate the freedom of our own ego [Jacobi]
	Full Idea: If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and mere ego, with its autonomy and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for me a curse - I deplore my existence.
	From: Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799], Ch.2), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro
	A reaction: This is a rebellion against Fichte's interpretation of Kant. It is a lovely cry from the heart on behalf of everyone who resents lines of philosophical thinking that seem to imprison the mind and cut us off from the ordinary world and real life.

23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism

7072	Jacobi was the first philosopher to talk of nihilism [Jacobi, by Critchley]
	Full Idea: Jacobi was the first to philosophically employ the concept of nihilism.
	From: report of Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2
	A reaction: Critchley explains that it was Jacobi's fear that Fichte was drawing nihilist conclusions from Kant's philosophy. This fear may be seen as the beginning of what is loosely called 'continental philosophy'. A worthy subject for thinkers...

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds

15146	Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

15151	Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Causal laws often do not make reference to kinds of objects at all, but rather summarize relations between quantitative, causally efficacious properties of objects.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
	A reaction: This would only be a serious challenge if it was not possible to translate talk of properties into talk of kinds, and vice versa.