40 ideas
12330 | In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou] |
Full Idea: From Aristotle to Hegel, logic was the philosophical category of ontology's dominion over language. The mathematization of logic has authorized language to become that which seizes philosophy for itself. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 8) |
9808 | Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Philosophy's role consists in informing mathematics of its own speculative grandeur. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.11) | |
A reaction: Revealing the grandeur of something sounds more like a rhetorical than a rational exercise. How would you reveal the grandeur of a sunset to someone? |
1749 | If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now [Aristippus elder] |
Full Idea: If all laws were abolished, philosophers would still live as they do now. | |
From: Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.4 | |
A reaction: Presumably philosophers develop inner laws which other people lack. |
12318 | The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou] |
Full Idea: The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998]) | |
A reaction: Too good to pass over, too crazy to file sensibly, too creepy to have been filed under humour, my candidate for the weirdest remark I have ever read in a serious philosopher, but no doubt if you read Lacan etc for long enough it looks deeply wise. |
12325 | Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Philosophy has been released from, even relieved of, physics, cosmology, and politics, as well as many other things. It is important for it to be released from ontology per se. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 3) | |
A reaction: A startling proposal, for anyone who thought that ontology was First Philosophy. Badiou wants to hand ontology over to mathematicians, but I am unclear what remains for the philosophers to do. |
12324 | Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Consensus is the enemy of thought. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
A reaction: A nice slogan for bringing Enlightenment optimists to a halt. I am struck. Do I allow my own thinking to always be diverted towards something which might result in a consensus? Do I actually (horror!) prefer consensus to truth? |
12337 | There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou] |
Full Idea: 'Transitivity' signifies that all of the elements of the set are also parts of the set. If you have α∈Β, you also have α⊆Β. This correlation of membership and inclusion gives a stability which is the sets' natural being. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12321 | The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou] |
Full Idea: The axiom of choice actually amounts to admitting an absolutely indeterminate infinite set whose existence is asserted albeit remaining linguistically indefinable. On the other hand, as a process, it is unconstructible. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
A reaction: If only constructible sets are admitted (see 'V = L') then there is a contradiction. |
12342 | Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) | |
A reaction: This will because logic will have a distinct theory within each 'topos'. |
12341 | Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Logic should first and foremost be a mathematical thought of what a universe of relations is. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) |
9812 | In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Only in mathematics can one unequivocally maintain that if thought can formulate a problem, it can and will solve it, regardless of how long it takes. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.17) | |
A reaction: I hope this includes proving the Continuum Hypothesis, and Goldbach's Conjecture. It doesn't seem quite true, but it shows why philosophers of a rationalist persuasion are drawn to mathematics. |
12335 | Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Number is an instance of measuring (distinguishing the more from the less, and calibrating data), ..and a figure for calculating (one counts with numbers), ..and it ought to be a figure of consistency (the compatibility of order and calculation). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12334 | There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Apparently - and this is quite unlike old Greek times - there is no single unified definition of number. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12333 | Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou] |
Full Idea: There is a heterogeneity of introductory procedures of different classical number types: axiomatic for natural numbers, structural for ordinals, algebraic for negative and rational numbers, topological for reals, mainly geometric for complex numbers. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) |
12322 | Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Do we have to confer existence on numbers whose principle is to no longer consist of units? | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
A reaction: This very nicely expresses what seems to me perhaps the most important question in the philosophy of mathematics. I am reluctant to accept such 'unitless' numbers, but I then feel hopelessly old-fashioned and naïve. What to do? |
9813 | Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Mathematics teaches us that there is no reason whatsoever to confne thinking within the ambit of finitude. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.19) | |
A reaction: This would perhaps make Cantor the greatest thinker who ever lived. It is an exhilarating idea, but we should ward the reader against romping of into unrestrained philosophical thought about infinities. You may be jumping without your Cantorian parachute. |
12327 | The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou] |
Full Idea: As we have known since Paul Cohen's theorem, the Continuum Hypothesis is intrinsically undecidable. Many believe Cohen's discovery has driven the set-theoretic project into ruin, or 'pluralized' what was once presented as a unified construct. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6) | |
A reaction: Badiou thinks the theorem completes set theory, by (roughly) finalising its map. |
12329 | If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou] |
Full Idea: If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it (as they are for the Platonist). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
A reaction: See also Idea 12328. I file this to connect it with Hellman's modal (and nominalist) version of structuralism. Could it be that mathematics and modal logic are identical? |
12328 | Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou] |
Full Idea: A Platonist's interest focuses on axioms in which the decision of thought is played out, where an Aristotelian or Leibnizian interest focuses on definitions laying out the representation of possibilities (...and the essence of mathematics is logic). | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 7) | |
A reaction: See Idea 12323 for the significance of the Platonist approach. So logicism is an Aristotelian project? Frege is not a true platonist? I like the notion of 'the representation of possibilities', so will vote for the Aristotelians, against Badiou. |
12331 | Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Logic is definitional, whereas real mathematics is axiomatic. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 10) |
12340 | There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou] |
Full Idea: The fundamental theorem that 'there does not exist a set of all sets' designates the inexistence of Being as a whole. ...A crucial consequence of this property is that any ontological investigation is irremediably local. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 14) | |
A reaction: The second thought pushes Badiou into Topos Theory, where the real numbers (for example) have a separate theory in each 'topos'. |
9809 | Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Mathematics inscribes being as such. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.12) | |
A reaction: I don't pretend to understand that, but there is something about the purity and certainty of mathematics that makes us feel we are grappling with the core of existence. Perhaps. The same might be said of stubbing your toe on a bedpost. |
12323 | Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Existence is precisely Being itself in as much as thought decides it. And that decision orients thought essentially. ...It is when you decide upon what exists that you bind your thought to Being. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2) | |
A reaction: [2nd half p.57] Helpful for us non-Heideggerians to see what is going on. Does this mean that Being is Kant's noumenon? |
12332 | The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou] |
Full Idea: The saturation and collapse of the Euclidean idea of the being of number as One's procession signs the entry of the thought of Being into modern times. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 11) | |
A reaction: That is, by allowing that not all numbers are built of units, numbers expand widely enough to embrace everything we think of as Being. The landmark event is the acceptance of the infinite as a number. |
12326 | The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou] |
Full Idea: In Set Theory, the primitive name of Being is the void, the empty set. The whole hierarchy takes root in it. In a certain sense, it alone 'is'. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 6) | |
A reaction: This is the key to Badiou's view that ontology is mathematics. David Lewis pursued interesting enquiries in this area. |
9811 | It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou] |
Full Idea: It is of the essence of being to appear. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.16) | |
A reaction: Nice slogan. In my humble opinion 'continental' philosophy is well worth reading because, despite the fluffy rhetoric and the shameless egotism and the desire to shock the bourgeoisie, they occasionally make wonderfully thought-provoking remarks. |
16062 | A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined. |
16061 | If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C) | |
A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic. |
12320 | Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Enlightened by the Cantorian grounding of mathematics, we can assert ontology to be nothing other than mathematics itself. This has been the case ever since its Greek origin. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1) | |
A reaction: There seems to be quite a strong feeling among mathematicians that new 'realms of being' are emerging from their researches. Only a Platonist, of course, is likely to find this idea sympathetic. |
16060 | Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B) | |
A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism. |
16064 | The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow] |
Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property. | |
From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11) | |
A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream. |
12338 | We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou] |
Full Idea: There can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 1011b24) | |
A reaction: The first sentence seems to be bivalence, and the second sentence excluded middle. |
9814 | All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou] |
Full Idea: Like every great poet, Mallarmé was engaged in a tacit rivalry with mathematics. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little [2004], p.20) | |
A reaction: I love these French pronouncements! Would Mallarmé have agreed? If poetry and mathematics are the poles, where is philosophy to be found? |
3558 | Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas] |
Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1 | |
A reaction: This looks like dropping out, but it could also be Keats's 'negative capability', of simply participating in existence without needing to do anything about it. |
5835 | The road of freedom is the surest route to happiness [Aristippus elder, by Xenophon] |
Full Idea: The surest road to happiness is not the path through rule nor through servitude, but through liberty. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Xenophon - Memorabilia of Socrates 2.1.9 | |
A reaction: The great anarchist slogan. Personally I don't believe it, because I agree a little with Hobbes that authority is required to make cooperation flourish, and that is essential for full happiness. If I were a slave, I would agree with Aristippus. |
3018 | People who object to extravagant pleasures just love money [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: When blamed for buying expensive food he asked "Would you have bought it for just three obols?" When the person said yes, he said,"Then it is not that I am fond of pleasure, but that you are fond of money". | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.4 |
1751 | Pleasure is the good, because we always seek it, it satisfies us, and its opposite is the most avoidable thing [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Pleasure is the good because we desire it from childhood, when we have it we seek nothing further, and the most avoidable thing is its opposite, pain. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.8 |
1755 | Errors result from external influence, and should be corrected, not hated [Aristippus elder, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Errors ought to meet with pardon, for a man does not err intentionally, but influenced by some external circumstances. We should not hate someone who has erred, but teach him better. | |
From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.Ar.9 |
12316 | For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou] |
Full Idea: For the philosophers of the Enlightenment politics is strictly the affair of humankind, an immanent practice from which recourse to the All Mighty's providential organization had to be discarded. | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], Prol) |
12317 | The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou] |
Full Idea: The God of metaphysics makes sense of existing according to a proof, while the God of religion makes sense of living according to an encounter | |
From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], Prol) |