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19378
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Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
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Full Idea:
For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
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From:
Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
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A reaction:
It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.
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15282
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Facts should be deducible from the theory and initial conditions, and prefer the simpler theory [Osiander, by Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The two positivist criteria for a scientific theory are that the facts must be deducible from the theory together with initial conditions, and if there is more than one theory the simplest must be chosen.
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From:
report of Andreas Osiander (Preface to 'De Revolutionibus' [1543]) by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 7.I
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A reaction:
Harré and Madden cite this as a famous early statement of positivism. It seems to combine Hempel and Lewis very concisely. Wrong, of course. It does not, though, appear to mention 'laws'.
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