Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, R Martin / J Barresi and Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A

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10 ideas

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity

5504	Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: Some recent philosophers have argued that we should replace the three-dimensional view of persons with a four-dimensional view according to which only time-slices, or 'stages', of persons exist at short intervals of time.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: At first glance this seems to neatly eliminate lots of traditional worries. But why would I want to retain my identity, if someone threatened to brainwash me. I also want to disown my inadequate earlier selves. Interesting, though. Lewis.

5503	Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: A modern question is whether personal identity is primarily what matters in survival; that is, people might cease and be continued by others whose continuation the original people would value as much.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.3)
	A reaction: When put like this, the proposal seems hard to grasp. It only makes sense if you don't really believe in a thing called 'personal identity'. I don't see how you can believe in it without also believing that for you it has central importance.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

5502	Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In modern times the Lockean intrinsic relations view of personal identity has been superseded by an extrinsic relations view (also called the 'closest-continuer' or 'externalist' view).
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.1)
	A reaction: Sounds sweeping. My suspicion is that there is a raging fashion for externalist views of everything (justification, content etc.), but this will pass. I take Parfit to be the source of the modern views.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics

22808	Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
	Full Idea: Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
	From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
	A reaction: Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique

22803	Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit]
	Full Idea: How can an individualist theory justify an obligation to fight for the state in the case of war?
	From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
	A reaction: The most dramatic example of obliging citizens to contribute to the state, the notable other case being taxes. Some imagined ancient 'social contract' doesn't seem sufficient for later generations. Does being naturally sociable create such obligations?

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism

22804	Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit]
	Full Idea: Communitarians often argue that personal autonomy is better achieved within the community.
	From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
	A reaction: Hegel is the source of this view. The simplest version of the point is that autonomy can only be asserted if a person has rights, which can be asserted and defended, and only a society can provide that. That is plausible.

22806	Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
	Full Idea: Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
	From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
	A reaction: A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism

22807	If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
	Full Idea: If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
	From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
	A reaction: This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights

6005	Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
	Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us.
	From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus
	A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts?

29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality

5505	For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi]
	Full Idea: In Aristotle's view, with the possible exception of 'nous' the psyche and all its parts come into being at the same time as its associated body; it is inseparable from the body, and perishes along with it.
	From: R Martin / J Barresi (Introduction to 'Personal Identity' [2003], p.8)
	A reaction: It is suggested that he thought there was only one 'nous', which all humans share (p.9). If he wants to claim that one part is immortal, he doesn't have much evidence. If psyche is the form of the body, it is bound to perish.