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15045
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The big issue since the eighteenth century has been: what is Reason? Its effect, limits and dangers? [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
I think the central issue of philosophy and critical thought since the eighteenth century has always been, still is, and will, I hope, remain the question: What is this Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits and dangers?
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From:
Michel Foucault (Space, Knowledge and Power (interview) [1982], p.358)
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A reaction:
One can hardly deny the fairness of the question, but I hope that won't prevent us from trying to be rational. Maybe logicians do a better job of clarifying reason than the political and historical speculations of Foucault?
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15038
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Structuralism systematically abstracted the event from sciences, and even from history [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
One can agree that structuralism formed the most systematic effort to evacuate the concept of the event, not only from ethnology but from a whole series of other sciences and in the extreme case from history.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.115)
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A reaction:
'Abstract' might be a better word than 'evacuate'. In that sense, this at least seems to have it the right way round - that structure can be abstracted, but in no way can a structure be prior to its components (pace Ladyman, Shapiro etc).
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7420
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When logos controls our desires, we have actually become the logos [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
Plutarch says if you have mastered principles then logos will silence your desires like a master silencing a dog - in which case the logos functions without intervention on your part - you have become the logos, or the logos has become you.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.286)
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A reaction:
If you believe that logos is pure reason, you might be quite happy with this, but if you thought it was a cultural construct, you might feel that you had been cunningly enslaved. If I ask 'what is 7+6?', logos interrupts me to give the answer.
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15044
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'Truth' is the procedures for controlling which statements are acceptable [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.132)
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A reaction:
Foucault is not absurdly relativist about this, but I don't think I agree, even in his terms. In a sexually prudish culture, blunt sexual truths are clearly true to everyone, but totally unacceptable. Society shudders when unacceptable truths are spoken.
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15042
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Truth doesn't arise from solitary freedom, but from societies with constraints [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
Truth isn't a reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.131)
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A reaction:
This obviously has a degree of truth in many areas of human belief, but I just don't buy it as an account of Newton's researches into optics, or Lavoisier's chemistry. Politics is more involved once big money is required.
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15037
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Why does knowledge appear in sudden bursts, and not in a smooth continuous development? [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
How is it that at certain moments and in certain orders of knowledge, there are these sudden take-offs, these hastenings of evolution, these transformations which fail to correspond to the calm, continuist image that is normally accredited?
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.114)
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A reaction:
The answer is either in the excitement of a new motivation, which may concern power, or may concern pure understanding - or else it is just that one discovery brings a host of others along with (like discovering DNA).
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21941
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Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Unlike Marxists, Foucault's project is to offer an internal account of human thinking, without assuming a privileged status for the conscious content of that thought.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (works [1978]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 4
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A reaction:
His project is historical. Personally I resent anyone who claims to understand my thought better than I do. I suppose my intellectual duty is to read Foucault, and see (honestly) whether his project applies to me.
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22235
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Feelings are not unchanging, but have a history (especially if they are noble) [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
We believe that feelings are immutable, but every sentiment, particularly the most noble and disinterested, has a history.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Nietzsche, Genealogy, History [1971], p.86), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 5
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A reaction:
This is the sort of remark that makes me think Foucault is worth reading. Aristotle thought you could teach correct feelings. That implies that you can also teach incorrect feelings.
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7271
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Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
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A reaction:
I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.
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20400
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Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
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Full Idea:
Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
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From:
report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
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A reaction:
Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
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7268
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The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
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Full Idea:
We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
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From:
W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
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A reaction:
Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
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15041
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Power doesn't just repress, but entices us with pleasure, artefacts, knowledge and discourse [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
If power was only repressive, would we obey it? What makes power accepted is the fact …that it also traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.120)
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A reaction:
Once you present 'power' this way, it permeates so deeply into human activity that it is in danger of becoming a mere triviality of social analysis. Is every conversation that ever took place actually a power struggle?
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7425
|
The aim is not to eliminate power relations, but to reduce domination [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
The problem is not to dissolve power relations in a utopia of transparent communications, but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, the morality, the practice of the self, that allows games of power with minimum domination.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.298)
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A reaction:
If you are a democrat it is hard to disagree with this, though I am still unclear why being dominated should rank as a total disaster. A healthy personal relationship might involve domination. 'Management techniques' is interesting.
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22236
|
The big question of the Renaissance was how to govern everything, from the state to children [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
How to govern was one of the fundamental question of the fifteenth and sixteenth century. ...How to govern children, the poor and beggars, how to govern the family, a house, how to govern armies, different groups, cities, states, and govern one's self.
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From:
Michel Foucault (What is Critique? [1982], p.28), quoted by Johanna Oksala - How to Read Foucault 9
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A reaction:
A nice example of Foucault showing how things we take for granted (techniques of control) have been slowly learned, and then taught as standard. Of course, the Romans knew how to govern an army.
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21947
|
Power is localised, so we either have totalitarian centralisation, or local politics [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's analysis suggests that meaningful revolution, hence genuine liberation, is impossible: the only alternative to the modern net of micro-centres of power is totalitatian domination. Hence his politics, even when revolutionary, is always local.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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A reaction:
It is hard to disagree with this.
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21946
|
Prisons gradually became our models for schools, hospitals and factories [Foucault, by Gutting]
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Full Idea:
Foucault's thesis is that disciplinary techniques introduced for criminals became the model for other modern sites of control (schools, hospitals, factories), so that prison discipline pervades all of society.
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From:
report of Michel Foucault (Discipline and Punish [1977]) by Gary Gutting - Foucault: a very short introduction 8
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A reaction:
Someone recently designed Foucault Monopoly, where every location is a prison. All tightly controlled organisations, such as a medieval monastery, or the Roman army, will inevitably share many features.
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7418
|
The idea of liberation suggests there is a human nature which has been repressed [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
I am somewhat suspicious of the notion of liberation, because one runs the risk of falling back on the idea that there is a human nature, that has been concealed or alienated by mechanisms of repression.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Ethics of the Concern for Self as Freedom [1984], p.282)
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A reaction:
Personally I think there is (to some extent) a human nature, and that it fails to flourish if it gets too much 'liberation. However, the world contains a lot more repression than liberation, so we should all be fans of liberty.
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15039
|
History lacks 'meaning', but it can be analysed in terms of its struggles [Foucault]
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Full Idea:
History has no 'meaning', but it is not absurd or incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible of analysis down to the smallest detail - but this in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.
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From:
Michel Foucault (Truth and Power (interview) [1976], p.116)
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A reaction:
I take this to be an essentially Marxist view, in which one teases out the dialectical processes of any period. I can't think of a better way to approach history. The alternative is to only recount one side of the struggle, which must be bad history.
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