11 ideas
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: I propose a dispositional ontology for the physical world, according to which a) every structural property is a dispositional one, b) a physical object is an ordered set of dispositions, and c) every event manifests a dispositional property of the world. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Mumford says this is consistent with ontology as a way of describing the world, rather than being facts about the world. I like Fetzer's sketch, which sounds to have a lot in common with 'process philosophy'. |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Every atomic event in the world's history is a manifestation of some dispositional property of the world and every physical object is an instantiation of some set of dispositions; hence, every structural property is dispositional in kind. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 5) | |
| A reaction: I quite like this drastic view, but there remains the intuition that there must always be something which has the disposition. That may be because I have not yet digested the lessons of modern physics. |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| Full Idea: Hermarchus said that animal killing is justified by considerations of human safety and nourishment and by animals' inability to form contractual relations of justice with us. | |
| From: report of Hermarchus (fragments/reports [c.270 BCE]) by David A. Sedley - Hermarchus | |
| A reaction: Could the last argument be used to justify torturing animals? Or could we eat a human who was too brain-damaged to form contracts? |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Kinds of things are specific arrangements of dispositions. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 2) | |
| A reaction: A 'disposition' doesn't seem quite the right word for what is basic to the physical world, though Harré and Madden make a good case for the 'fields' of physic being understood in that way. I prefer 'power', though that doesn't solve anything. |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
| Full Idea: Lawlike sentences are conceived as logically general dispositional statements attributing permanent dispositional properties to every member of a reference class. ...Their basic form is that of subjunctive generalizations. | |
| From: J.H. Fetzer (A World of Dispositions [1977], 3) | |
| A reaction: I much prefer talk of 'lawlike sentences' to talk of 'laws'. At least they imply that the true generalisations about nature are fairly fine-grained. Why not talk of 'generalisations' instead of 'laws'? Fetzer wants dispositions to explain everything. |
| 7602 | In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: In the Bible God changes his mind, as when he repents of having made man and decides to destroy the human race in the Flood. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: It becomes apparent that the most startling feature of Christian fundamentalism is its uncritical reading of the Bible, in which passages are wilfully lifted from context, and inconvenient inconsistencies are ruthlessly ignored. |
| 7605 | Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: We have become so used to the intolerance of monotheism that we may not appreciate that its hostility towards other gods was a new religious attitude; paganism was an essentially tolerant faith. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The comedian Dave Allen always signed off with "may your god go with you". To me the most striking feature of monotheists is frequently their barely controlled aggression, beneath a mask of strained compassion. |
| 7599 | Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: Around the eighth century BCE the gods ceased to be very important in India, and would be superseded by the religious teacher, who would be considered higher than the gods. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: At least there has been one culture that gave an appropriate status to teachers. It seems astonishing in that age that human beings could have higher status than gods - way before the European 'humanists'. |
| 7597 | There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: It is very difficult to find a single monotheistic statement in the whole of the Pentateuch, and even the Ten Commandments take the existence of other gods for granted ("There shall be no strange gods for you before my face"). | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: The transition from polytheism to monotheism is very strange. First God is 'jealous' of other gods, then supremely above them, and eventually totally exclusive. It's like watching the rise of Stalin. |
| 7606 | The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: Jesus himself certainly never claimed to be God, and the doctrine that Jesus had been God in human form was not finalised until the fourth century. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: It was this final view which seems to have provoked Muhammed into developing a religion with the slogan "there is only one God". In Christianity an initially promising set of teachings grew into a prolonged irrational hysteria. |
| 7596 | Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K] |
| Full Idea: There is a distinction between belief in a set of propositions and a faith which enables us to put our trust in them. | |
| From: Karen Armstrong (A History of God [1993], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is interestingly distinct from the usual idea that faith is putting belief in propositions which are not sufficiently rationally justified. How many philosophers actually have faith in the propositions they say they believe? |