Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Richard Foley and William Whewell

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7 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence

12801	Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
	Full Idea: Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.317)
	A reaction: I have always like the coherentist view of justification, and now I see that this has led me to the question of explanation, which in turn has led me to essentialism. It's all coming together. Watch this space. 'Explanatory' is the key to everything!

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism

19708	Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
	Full Idea: In Foley's subjective internalist account it is egocentrically rational for an agent to believe a proposition only if he would think on deep reflection that believing it is conducive to having an accurate and comprehensive belief system.
	From: report of Richard Foley (The Theory of Epistemic Rationality [1987], 2.1 B) by Hamid Vahid - Externalism/Internalism
	A reaction: I like this idea, because it indicates the link between internalism and coherence about justification. I don't think you can be an externalist coherence theorist for justification. [Reminder: Paul Thagard is the best writer on coherence].

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism

12800	Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
	Full Idea: Externalists are principally interested in understanding what knowledge is, ..while internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification ..from one's own perspective.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.314)
	A reaction: I find this very helpful, since I have a strong bias towards internalism (with a social dimension), and I see now that it is because I am more interested in what a (good) justification is than what some entity in reality called 'knowledge' consists of.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification

12802	We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
	Full Idea: It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320)
	A reaction: [See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end.

12803	Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley]
	Full Idea: One justifiably believes a proposition if one has an epistemically rational belief that one's procedures with respect to it have been acceptable, given practical limitations, and one's goals.
	From: Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.322)
	A reaction: I quite like this, except that it is too individualistic. My goals, and my standards of acceptability decree whether I know? I don't see the relevance of goals; only a pragmatist would mention such a thing. Standards of acceptability are social.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience

20643	Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell]
	Full Idea: Consilience is the jumping together of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation.
	From: William Whewell (The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences [1840]), quoted by Peter Watson - Convergence Intro 'United'
	A reaction: Apparently this is the first use of the word, which was popularised by E.O. Wilson in recent times. If, as I do, you dream of a final theory, in philosophy as well as in science, then you have to be a fan of consilience.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction

20653	Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
	Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
	From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
	A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?