70 ideas
| 7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Philosophical problems are problems about how what is actual is possible, given that what is actual appears, because of some faulty argument, to be impossible. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: [She is discussing universals when she makes this comment] A very appealing remark, given that most people come into philosophy because of a mixture of wonder and puzzlement. It is a rather Wittgensteinian view, though, that we must cure our own ills. |
| 7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: In 'She did it for the sake of her country' no one thinks that the expression 'the sake' refers to an individual thing, a sake. But given that, how can we work out what the ontological commitments of a theory actually are? | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: For these sorts of reasons it rapidly became obvious that ordinary language analysis wasn't going to reveal much, but it is also a problem for a project like Quine's, which infers an ontology from the terms of a scientific theory. |
| 9123 | Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen] |
| Full Idea: Priest says there is room for contradictions. He gives the example of someone in a doorway; is he in or out of the room. Given that in and out are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, and neither is the default, he seems to be both in and not in. | |
| From: report of Graham Priest (What is so bad about Contradictions? [1998]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction 4.3 | |
| A reaction: Priest is a clever lad, but I don't think I can go with this. It just seems to be an equivocation on the word 'in' when applied to rooms. First tell me the criteria for being 'in' a room. What is the proposition expressed in 'he is in the room'? |
| 7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of composition makes the erroneous assumption that every property of the things that constitute a thing is a property of the thing as well. But every large object is constituted by small parts, and every red object by colourless parts. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.5) | |
| A reaction: There are nice questions here like 'If you add lots of smallness together, why don't you get extreme smallness?' Colours always make bad examples in such cases (see Idea 5456). Distinctions are needed here (e.g. Idea 7007). |
| 8720 | A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend] |
| Full Idea: Priest and Routley have developed paraconsistent relevant logic. 'Relevant' logics insist on there being some sort of connection between the premises and the conclusion of an argument. 'Paraconsistent' logics allow contradictions. | |
| From: report of Graham Priest (works [1998]) by Michčle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 6.8 | |
| A reaction: Relevance blocks the move of saying that a falsehood implies everything, which sounds good. The offer of paraconsistency is very wicked indeed, and they are very naughty boys for even suggesting it. |
| 9672 | Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Free logic is an unusual example of a non-classical logic which is first-order. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], Pref) |
| 9697 | X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets, the set of all the n-tuples with its first member in X1, its second in X2, and so on. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.0) |
| 9685 | <a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: <a,b> is a set whose members occur in the order shown; <x1,x2,x3, ..xn> is an 'n-tuple' ordered set. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
| 9675 | a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: a ∈ X means that a is a member of the set X, that is, a is one of the objects in X. a ∉ X indicates that a is not in X. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
| 9674 | {x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: {x; A(x)} indicates a set of objects which satisfy the condition A(x). | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
| 9673 | {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: {a1, a2, ...an} indicates that the set comprises of just those objects. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
| 9677 | Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
| 9676 | {a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: {a} is the 'singleton' set of a, not to be confused with the object a itself. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
| 9679 | X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y, but some things in Y are not in X) | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 9678 | X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y (if and only if all of its members are members of Y). | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 9681 | X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X = Y means the set X equals the set Y, which means they have the same members (i.e. X⊆Y and Y⊆X). | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 9683 | X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in both X and Y. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9682 | X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: X ∪ Y indicates the 'union' of sets X and Y, which is a set containing just those things that are in X or Y (or both). | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9684 | Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Y - X indicates the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y, that is, all the things in Y that are not in X. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9694 | The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The 'relative complement' of one set with respect to another is the things in the second set that aren't in the first. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9693 | The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The 'intersection' of two sets is a set containing the things that are in both sets. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9692 | The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.8) |
| 9698 | The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The 'induction clause' says that whenever one constructs more complex formulas out of formulas that have the property P, the resulting formulas will also have that property. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.2) |
| 9695 | An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
| 9696 | A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.10) |
| 9686 | A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A 'set' is a collection of objects. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
| 9689 | The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The 'empty set' or 'null set' is a set with no members. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
| 9690 | A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 9691 | A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A set is a 'proper subset' of another set if some things in the large set are not in the smaller set | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 9688 | A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A 'singleton' is a set with only one member. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.4) |
| 9687 | A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set. | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.2) |
| 9680 | The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself). | |
| From: Graham Priest (Intro to Non-Classical Logic (1st ed) [2001], 0.1.6) |
| 13373 | Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: A natural principle is the same kind of paradox will have the same kind of solution. Standardly Ramsey's first group are solved by denying the existence of some totality, and the second group are less clear. But denial of the groups sink both. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §5) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sums up the argument of Priest's paper, which is that it is Ramsey's division into two kinds (see Idea 13334) which is preventing us from getting to grips with the paradoxes. Priest, notoriously, just lives with them. |
| 13368 | The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: König: there are indefinable ordinals, and the least indefinable ordinal has just been defined in that very phrase. (Recall that something is definable iff there is a (non-indexical) noun-phrase that refers to it). | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: Priest makes great subsequent use of this one, but it feels like a card trick. 'Everything indefinable has now been defined' (by the subject of this sentence)? König, of course, does manage to pick out one particular object. |
| 13370 | 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Berry: if we take 'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words', we can generate a number which is and is not one of these numbers. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: [not enough space to spell this one out in full] |
| 13369 | By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Richard: φ(x) is 'x is a definable real number between 0 and 1' and ψ(x) is 'x is definable'. We can define a real by diagonalization so that it is not in x. It is and isn't in the set of reals. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §3) | |
| A reaction: [this isn't fully clear here because it is compressed] |
| 13366 | The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Burali-Forti: φ(x) is 'x is an ordinal', and so w is the set of all ordinals, On; δ(x) is the least ordinal greater than every member of x (abbreviation: log(x)). The contradiction is that log(On)∈On and log(On)∉On. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
| 13367 | The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: Mirimanoff: φ(x) is 'x is well founded', so that w is the cumulative hierarchy of sets, V; &delta(x) is just the power set of x, P(x). If x⊆V, then V∈V and V∉V, since δ(V) is just V itself. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §2) |
| 13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: In the family of the Liar is the Knower Paradox, where φ(x) is 'x is known to be true', and there is a set of known things, Kn. By knowing a sentence is not in the known sentences, you know its truth. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
| A reaction: [mostly my wording] |
| 13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
| Full Idea: There are liar chains which fit the pattern of Transcendence and Closure, as can be seen with the simplest case of the Liar Pair. | |
| From: Graham Priest (The Structure of Paradoxes of Self-Reference [1994], §4) | |
| A reaction: [Priest gives full details] Priest's idea is that Closure is when a set is announced as complete, and Transcendence is when the set is forced to expand. He claims that the two keep coming into conflict. |
| 7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: There are four kinds of reduction: the identifying of entities of two theories by means of bridge or correlation laws; the elimination of entities in favour of the other theory; reducing by bridge laws and property identities; and merely reducing talk. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3 n5) | |
| A reaction: [She gives references] The idea of 'bridge laws' I regard with caution. If bridge laws are ceteris paribus, they are not much help, and if they are strict, or necessary, then there must be an underlying reason for that, which is probably elimination. |
| 7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: In statements attributing relational properties ('Felix is my favourite cat'), it seems clear that the property truly attributed to the substance is not essential to it. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: A fairly obvious point, but an important one when mapping out (cautiously) what we actually mean by 'property'. However, maybe the relational property is essential: the ceiling is ('is' of predication!) above the room. |
| 7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The relation of being taller than is an external relation, since it relates two independent material substances, but the relation of instantiation or exemplification is internal, in that it relates a substance with a property. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: An interesting revival of internal relations. To be plausible it would need clear notions of 'property' and 'substance'. We are getting a long way from physics, and I sense Ockham stropping his Razor. How do you individuate a 'relation'? |
| 7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: An object's being two inches long seems to guarantee an infinite number of other properties, such as being less than three inches long. If we must understand the second property to understand the first, then there seems to be a vicious infinite regress. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: She dismisses this by saying that we don't need to know an infinity of numbers in order to count. I would say that we just need to distinguish between intrinsic and relational properties. You needn't know all a thing's relations to know the thing. |
| 7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Tropes are abstract entities, at least in the sense that more than one can be in the same place at the same time (e.g. redness and roundness). But they are not universals, because they have unique and particular locations. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: I'm uneasy about the reification involved in this kind of talk. Does a coin possess a thing called 'roundness', which then has to be individuated, identified and located? I am drawn to the two extreme views, and suspicious of compromise. |
| 7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Trope Nominalism says properties are classes or sets of exactly similar or resembling tropes, where tropes are what we might called 'property-tokens' or 'particularized properties'. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: We still seem to have the problem of 'resembling' here, and we certainly have the perennial problem of why any given particular should be placed in any particular set. See Idea 7959. |
| 7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Trope 'Nominalism' is not a version of nominalism, because tropes are abstract particulars, rather than concrete particulars. Of course, a trope account of the relations between particulars and their properties has ramifications for concrete particulars. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16) | |
| A reaction: Cf. Idea 7971. At this point the boundary between nominalist and realist theories seems to blur. Possibly that is bad news for tropes. Not many dilemmas can be solved by simply blurring the boundary. |
| 7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The problem is how a group of resembling tropes can be of the same type, that is, that they can resemble one another in the same way. This problem is not settled simply by positing tropes. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a fundamental fact that there is no resemblance unless the respect of resemblance is specified. Two identical objects could still said to be different because of their locations. Is resemblance natural or conventional? Consider atoms. |
| 7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Of all the nominalist solutions, Trope Nominalism is the only one that tries to solve the problem at issue by introducing entities; all the others try to get by with concrete particulars and sets of them. This might invite Ockham's Razor. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: We could reply that tropes are necessities. The issue seems to be a key one, which is whether our fundamental onotology should include properties (in some form or other). I am inclined to exclude them (Ideas 3322, 3906, 4029). |
| 7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical sameness is explained by a theory of identity, but what explains qualitative sameness? | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: The distinction is between type and token identity. Tokens are particulars, and types are sets, so her question comes down to the one of what entitles something to be a member of a set? Nothing, if sets are totally conventional, but they aren't. |
| 7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The 'one over many' problem is to explain how universals can unify their instances if they are wholly other than them. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: If universals are self-predicating (beauty is beautiful) then they have a massive amount in common, despite one being general. You then have the regress problem of explaining the beauty of the beautiful. Baffling regress, or baffling participation. |
| 7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: All real forms of Nominalism should hold that the only objects relevant to the explanation of generality are concrete particulars, words (i.e. word-tokens, not word-types), and perhaps sets. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6 n16) | |
| A reaction: The addition of sets seems controversial (see Idea 7970). The context is her rejection of the use of tropes in nominalist theories. I would doubt whether a theory still counted as nominalist if it admitted sets (e.g. Quine). |
| 7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain the fact that we know when and in what way new objects resemble old ones, and that we know when and in what ways new objects do not resemble old ones. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: It is not clear what sort of theory would be needed to 'explain' such a thing. Unless there is an explanation of resemblance waiting in the wings (beyond asserting that resemblance is a universal), then this is not a strong objection. |
| 7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The so-called 'laws of thinghood' govern particulars, saying that one thing cannot be wholly present at different places at the same time, and two things cannot occupy the same place at the same time. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.6) | |
| A reaction: Is this an empirical observation, or a tautology? Or might it even be a priori synthetic? What happens when two water drops or clouds merge? Or an amoeba fissions? In what sense is an image in two places at once? Se also Idea 2351. |
| 7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: We can usefully refer to 'individuation conditions', to distinguish objects of that kind from objects not of that kind, and to 'identity conditions', to distinguish objects within that kind from one another. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: So we individuate types or sets, and identify tokens or particulars. Sounds good. Should be in every philosopher's toolkit, and on every introductory philosophy course. |
| 7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Substances have a kind of unity that mere collocations of properties do not have, namely an instrinsic unity. So substances cannot be collocations - bundles - of properties. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: A team is a unity. Compare a similar thought, Idea 1395, about personal identity. How can something which is a pure unity have more than one property? What distinguishes substances? Why can't a substance have a certain property? |
| 7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The bundle theory of substance requires unconditional commitment to the truth of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles: that things that are alike with respect to all of their properties are identical. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Since the identity of indiscernibles is very dubious (see Ideas 1365, 4476, 5746, 7928), this is bad news for the bundle theory. I suspect that all of these problems arise because no one seems to have a clear concept of a property. |
| 7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Commitment to the view that only what can be an object of possible sensory experience can exist eliminates the possibility of distinguishing between substance and attribute, leaving only one alternative, namely the bundle view. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Phenomenalism strikes me as a paradigm case of confusing ontology with epistemology. Presumably physicists (even empiricist ones) are committed to the 'interior' of quarks and electrons, but no one expects to experience them. |
| 7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The bundle theory makes all true statements ascribing properties to substances uninformative, by making them logical truths. The property of being a feline animal is literally a constituent of a cat. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: The solution would seem to a distinction between accidental and essential properties. Compare 'that plane is red' with 'that plane has wings'. 'Of course it does - it's a plane'. We might still survive without a plane-substance. |
| 7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Substances are capable of persisting through change, where this involves change in properties; but the bundle theory has the consequence that substances cannot survive change. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Her example is an apple remaining an apple when it turns brown. It doesn't look, though, as if there is a precise moment when the apple-substance ceases. The end of an apple seems to be more a matter of a loss of crucial properties. |
| 7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Maybe a substance is not itself a bundle of properties, but a sum or sequence of bundles of properties, a bundle of bundles of properties (which 'perdures' rather than 'endures'). | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: There remains the problem of deciding when the bundle has drifted too far away from the original to perdure correctly. A caterpillar can turn into a butterfly (which is pretty bizarre!), but not into a cathedral. Why? She says this idea denies change. |
| 7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: Because a statue and the lump of matter that constitute it have different persistence conditions, they are not identical. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: Maybe being a statue is a relational property? All the relational properties of a thing will have different persistence conditions. Suppose I see a face in a bowl of sugar, and you don't? |
| 7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: The three main theories of substance are the bundle theory (Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Ayer), the bare substratum theory (Locke and Bergmann), and the essentialist theory. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: Macdonald defends the essentialist theory. The essentialist view immediately appeals to me. Properties must be OF something, and the something must have the power to produce properties. So there. |
| 7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: A rival to the bundle theory says that, for each substance, there is a constituent of it that is not a property but is both essential and unique to it, this constituent being referred to as a 'bare particular' or 'substratum'. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't sound promising. It is unclear what existence devoid of all properties could be like. How could it 'have' its properties if it was devoid of features (it seems to need property-hooks)? It is an ontological black hole. How do you prove it? |
| 7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: If there is a substratum or bare particular within a substance, this gives an explanation of the unity of substances, and it is something which can survive intact when a substance changes. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: [v. compressed wording] Many problems here. The one that strikes me is that when things change they sometimes lose their unity and identity, and that seems to be decided entirely from observation of properties, not from assessing the substratum. |
| 7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: There seems to be no way of identifying a substratum as the bearer of qualities without qualifiying it as bare (having the property of being bare?), ..and they cannot be used to individuate things, because they are necessarily indiscernible. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: The defence would probably be a priori, claiming an axiomatic necessity for substrata in our thinking about the world, along with a denial that bareness is a property (any more than not being a contemporary of Napoleon is a property). |
| 7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: There are three distinct versions of Leibniz's Law, all traced to remarks made by Leibniz: the Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing), the Indiscernibility of Identicals (same thing, same properties), and the Substitution Principle. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: The best view seems to be to treat the second one as Leibniz's Law (and uncontroversially true), and the first one as being an interesting but dubious claim. |
| 7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: One common argument to the conclusion that the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is false is that it is not necessarily true. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2 n32) | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a good argument. If you test the Principle with an example ('this butler is the murderer') then total identity does not seem to necessitate identity, though it strongly implies it (the butler may have a twin etc). |
| 20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
| Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles. | |
| From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro' | |
| A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture? |
| 7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
| Full Idea: What matters to continuity is not just the beginning and end states of the process by which a thing persists, perhaps through change, but the process itself. | |
| From: Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as being a really important insight. Compare Idea 4931. If this is the key to understanding mind and personal identity, it means that the concept of a 'process' must be a central issue in ontology. How do you individuate a process? |