Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A and Reiss,J/Spreger,J

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


14 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
One view says objectivity is making a successful claim which captures the facts [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: One conception of objectivity is that the facts are 'out there', and it is the task of scientists to discover, analyze and sytematize them. 'Objective' is a success word: if a claim is objective, it successfully captures some feature of the world.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to describe truth, rather than objectivity. You can establish accurate facts by subjective means. You can be fairly objective but miss the facts. Objectivity is a mode of thought, not a link to reality.
An absolute scientific picture of reality must not involve sense experience, which is perspectival [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Sense experience is necessarily perspectival, so to the extent to which scientific theories are to track the absolute conception [of reality], they must describe a world different from sense experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: This is a beautifully simple and interesting point. Even when you are looking at a tree, to grasp its full reality you probably need to close your eyes (which is bad news for artists).
Topic and application involve values, but can evidence and theory choice avoid them? [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: There may be values involved in the choice of a research problem, the gathering of evidence, the acceptance of a theory, and the application of results. ...The first and fourth do involve values, but what of the second and third?
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] My own view is that the danger of hidden distorting values has to be recognised, but it is then possible, by honest self-criticism, to reduce them to near zero. Sociological enquiry is different, of course.
The Value-Free Ideal in science avoids contextual values, but embraces epistemic values [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: According to the Value-Free Ideal, scientific objectivity is characterised by absence of contextual values and by exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.1)
     A reaction: This seems appealing, because it concedes that we cannot be value-free, without suggesting that we are unavoidably swamped by values. The obvious question is whether the two types of value can be sharply distinguished.
Value-free science needs impartial evaluation, theories asserting facts, and right motivation [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Three components of value-free science are Impartiality (appraising theories only by epistemic scientific standards), Neutrality (the theories make no value statements), and Autonomy (the theory is motivated only by science).
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 3.3)
     A reaction: [They are summarising Hugh Lacey, 1999, 2002] I'm not sure why the third criterion matters, if the first two are met. If a tobacco company commissions research on cigarettes, that doesn't necessarily make the findings false or prejudiced.
Thermometers depend on the substance used, and none of them are perfect [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: Thermometers assume the length of the fluid or gas is a function of temperature, and different substances yield different results. It was decided that different thermometers using the same substance should match, and air was the best, but not perfect.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.1)
     A reaction: [summarising Hasok Chang's research] This is a salutary warning that instruments do not necessarily solve the problem of objectivity, though thermometers do seem to be impersonal, and offer relative accuracy (i.e. ranking temperatures). Cf breathalysers.
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
The 'experimenter's regress' says success needs reliability, which is only tested by success [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The 'experimenter's regress' says that to know whether a result is correct, one needs to know whether the apparatus is reliable. But one doesn't know whether the apparatus is reliable unless one knows that it produces correct results ...and so on.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 2.3)
     A reaction: [H. Collins (1985), a sociologist] I take this to be a case of the triumphant discovery of a vicious circle which destroys all knowledge turning out to be a benign circle. We build up a coherent relationship between reliable results and good apparatus.
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
The Bayesian approach is explicitly subjective about probabilities [Reiss/Sprenger]
     Full Idea: The Bayesian approach is outspokenly subjective: probability is used for quantifying a scientist's subjective degree of belief in a particular hypothesis. ...It just provides sound rules for learning from experience.
     From: Reiss,J/Spreger,J (Scientific Objectivity [2014], 4.2)
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson]
     Full Idea: There are six 'reductive levels' in science: social groups, (multicellular) living things, cells, molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.
     From: report of H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim (Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis [1958]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 10 'Intro'
     A reaction: I have the impression that fields are seen as more fundamental that elementary particles. What is the status of the 'laws' that are supposed to govern these things? What is the status of space and time within this picture?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberalism is minimal government, or individual rights, or equality [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Liberalism has been defended as a theory of minimal government, or as a theory of basic individual rights, or as an egalitarian philosophy.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: Minimal government tends towards anarchist liberalism, but then what grounds the right to be free of government? Presumably any sensible theory of rights has to be egalitarian. What could ground unequal rights?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Can individualist theories justify an obligation to fight in a war? [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: How can an individualist theory justify an obligation to fight for the state in the case of war?
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: The most dramatic example of obliging citizens to contribute to the state, the notable other case being taxes. Some imagined ancient 'social contract' doesn't seem sufficient for later generations. Does being naturally sociable create such obligations?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Autonomy is better achieved within a community [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Communitarians often argue that personal autonomy is better achieved within the community.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §4)
     A reaction: Hegel is the source of this view. The simplest version of the point is that autonomy can only be asserted if a person has rights, which can be asserted and defended, and only a society can provide that. That is plausible.
Communitarians avoid oppression for the common good, by means of small mediating communities [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: Because of the mediating structures of small communities, communitarians are less fearful [than liberals] of the emergence of an oppressive government as a result of the politics of the common good.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: A politics of the common good has an obvious implicit conservatism because the central consensus is always likely to disapprove of errant individuals, of all sorts. Only individual rights can block an oppressive government.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
If our values are given to us by society then we have no grounds to criticise them [Avineri/De-Shalit]
     Full Idea: If communitarians are right that we are not free to choose, but rather that our values are determined by our community, the individualists say, then there is no reason to criticise the values of one's society.
     From: Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A (Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' [1992], §5)
     A reaction: This is an obvious challenge, but if one's concept of community is a forum for free debate then it can be overcome. There is no avoiding the fact, though, that a good community always needs a high degree of consensus.