19125
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If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
If truth can be explicitly defined, it can be eliminated.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3)
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A reaction:
That we could just say p corresponds to the facts, or p coheres with our accepted beliefs, or p is the aim of our enquiries, and never mention the word 'true'. Definition is a strategy for reduction or elimination.
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19127
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The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
Although the theory is materially adequate, Tarski thought that the T-sentences are deductively too weak. …Also it seems that the T-sentences are not conservative, because they prove in PA that 0=0 and ¬0=0 are different, so at least two objects exist.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.2)
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A reaction:
They are weak because they can't prove completeness. This idea give two reasons for looking for a better theory of truth.
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19124
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A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
If a natural theory of truth is added to Peano Arithmetic, it is not necessary to add explicity global reflection principles to assert soundness, as the truth theory proves them. Truth theories thus prove soundess, and allows its expression.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.2)
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A reaction:
This seems like a big attraction of axiomatic theories of truth for students of metamathematics.
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19126
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If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
If truth does not have any explanatory force, as some deflationists claim, the axioms of truth should not allow us to prove any new theorems that do not involve the truth predicate. That is, a deflationary axiomatisation of truth should be 'conservative'.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.3)
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A reaction:
So does truth have 'explanatory force'? These guys are interested in explaining theorems of arithmetic, but I'm more interested in real life. People do daft things because they have daft beliefs. Logic should be neutral, but truth has values?
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19129
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The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
It is a virtue of the Friedman-Sheard axiomatisation that it is thoroughly classical in its logic. Its drawback is that it is ω-inconsistent. That is, it proves &exists;x¬φ(x), but proves also φ(0), φ(1), φ(2), …
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.3)
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A reaction:
It seems the theory is complete (and presumably sound), yet not fully consistent. FS also proves the finite levels of Tarski's hierarchy, but not the transfinite levels.
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19130
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KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes a non-classical notion of truth. It allow truth-value gluts, making some sentences (such as the Liar) both true and not-true. Some authors add an axiom ruling out such gluts.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 4.4)
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A reaction:
[summary, which I hope is correct! Stanford is not wholly clear]
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6007
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If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
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Full Idea:
The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
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From:
report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
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A reaction:
Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
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6008
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Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
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Full Idea:
The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
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From:
report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
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A reaction:
(also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
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19121
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We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
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Full Idea:
One might say that 'x is a poor philosopher' is true of Tom instead of saying that Tom has the property of being a poor philosopher. We quantify over formulas instead of over definable properties, and thus reduce properties to truth.
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From:
Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1.1)
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A reaction:
[compressed] This stuff is difficult (because the axioms are complex and hard to compare), but I am excited (yes!) about this idea. Their point is that you need a truth predicate within the object language for this, which disquotational truth forbids.
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14221
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Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
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Full Idea:
Serious essentialism is the position that a) everything has an essence, b) essences are not themselves things, and c) essences are the ground for metaphysical necessity and possibility.
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From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Intro')
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A reaction:
If a house is being built, it might acquire an identity first, and only get an essence later. Essences can be physical, but if you extract them you destroy thing thing of which they were the essence. Does all of this apply to abstract 'things'.
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14222
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Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
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Full Idea:
The route into essentialism is, first, a recognition that the essence of a thing is "what it is to be" that (kind of) thing; the essence of a thing is just its identity.
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From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Essent')
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A reaction:
The first half sounds right, and very Aristotelian. The second half is dramatically different, controversial, and far less plausible. Slipping in 'kind of' is also highly dubious. This remark shows, I think, some confusion about essences.
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9220
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Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider]
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Full Idea:
If purple cows are simply absent from Lewis's multiverse, then certain correct propositions turn out to be impossible. Lewis must require a world for every possibility. But then it is circular, as the multiverse needs modal notions to characterize it.
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From:
report of Scott Shalkowski (Ontological Ground of Alethic Modality [1994], 3.9) by Theodore Sider - Reductive Theories of Modality 3.9
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A reaction:
[Inversely, a world containing a round square would make that possible] This sounds very nice, though Sider rejects it (p.197). I've never seen how you could define possibility using the concept of 'possible' worlds.
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14224
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Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
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Full Idea:
That 'all and only equilateral triangles are equiangular' required proof, and not for mere curiosity, is grounds for thinking that being an equilateral triangle is not the same property as being an equiangular triangle.
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From:
Scott Shalkowski (Essence and Being [2008], 'Serious')
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A reaction:
If you start with equiangularity, does equilateralness then require proof? This famous example is of two concepts which seem to be coextensional, but seem to have a different intension. Does a dependence relation drive a wedge between them?
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