Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Philolaus and Ray Billington

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Philosophers are revealed by their fears [Billington]
     Full Idea: To understand any philosopher, ask 'What are they afraid of?'.
     From: Ray Billington (talk [2010])
     A reaction: Yes! So... Plato - disorder. Aristotle - ignorance. Augustine - sin. Descartes - uncertainty. Spinoza - fragmentation. Leibniz - superficiality. Hume - speculation. Bentham - egotism. Kant - self-deception. Nietzsche - nihilism. Russell - imprecision.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
No things would be clear to us as entity or relationships unless there existed Number and its essence [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: No existing things would be clear to anyone, either in themselves or in their relationship to one another, unless there existed Number and its essence.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.03.8
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Some reasonings are stronger than we are [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Some reasonings are stronger than we are.
     From: Philolaus (fragments/reports [c.425 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - Eudemian Ethics 1225a33
     A reaction: This endorses the Aristotle view of akrasia (as opposed to the Socratic view). This isolated remark seems to imply that we are more clearly embodiments of will than of reason.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
Everything must involve numbers, or it couldn't be thought about or known [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Everything which is known has number, because otherwise it is impossible for anything to be the object of thought or knowledge.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B04), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7b
Harmony must pre-exist the cosmos, to bring the dissimilar sources together [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: It would have been impossible for the dissimilar and incompatible sources to have been made into an orderly universe unless harmony had been present in some form or other.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B06), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7d
There is no falsehood in harmony and number, only in irrational things [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: The nature of number and harmony admits of no falsehood; for this is unrelated to them. Falsehood and envy belong to the nature of the Unlimited and the Unintelligent and the Irrational.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B11), quoted by (who?) - where?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
Existing things, and hence the Cosmos, are a mixture of the Limited and the Unlimited [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Since it is plain that existing things are neither wholly from the Limiting, nor wholly from the Unlimited, clearly the cosmos and its contents were fitted together from both the Limiting and the Unlimited.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B02), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 1.21.7a
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
Self-created numbers make the universe stable [Philolaus]
     Full Idea: Number is the ruling and self-created bond which maintains the everlasting stability of the contents of the universe.
     From: Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE], B23), quoted by (who?) - where?
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Philolaus was the first person to say the earth moves in a circle [Philolaus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Philolaus was the first person to affirm that the earth moves in a circle.
     From: report of Philolaus (On the Cosmos (lost) [c.435 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 08.Ph.3