6 ideas
6007 | If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976). |
6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types. |
6008 | Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap. | |
From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School | |
A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213). |
6027 | From the fact that some men die, we cannot infer that they all do [Philodemus] |
Full Idea: There is no necessary inference, from the fact that men familiar to us die when pierced through the heart, that all men do. | |
From: Philodemus (On Signs (damaged) [c.50 BCE], 1.3) | |
A reaction: This is scepticism about the logic of induction, long before David Hume. This is said to be a Stoic argument against Epicureans - though on the whole Stoics are not keen on scepticism. |
7350 | The Torah just says: do not do to your neighbour what is hateful to you [Hillel the Elder] |
Full Idea: What is hateful to you, do not unto your neighbour: this is the entire Torah. All the rest is commentary - go and study it. | |
From: Hillel the Elder (reports [c.10]), quoted by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
A reaction: Johnson suggests that this idea, of stripping everything from the Torah except its basic morality, was passed on to Jesus by Hillel. Suppose you hate Arsenal, but your neighbour supports them, and they just won the European Cup? What should you do? |
22241 | Don't fear god or worry about death; the good is easily got and the terrible easily cured [Philodemus] |
Full Idea: Don't fear god, Don't worry about death; What is good is easy to get, What is terrible is easy to cure. | |
From: Philodemus (Herculaneum Papyrus [c.50 BCE], 1005,4.9-14) | |
A reaction: This is known as the Four-Part Cure, and is an epicurean prayer, probably formulated by Epicurus. |