Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Marcus Aurelius and Dmitri Mendeleev

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13 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A philosopher should have principles ready for understanding, like a surgeon with instruments [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so should you have principles ready for the understanding of things divine and human.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 3.13)
     A reaction: Nice. Philosophy is the training ground where wisdom and good living are made possible, but it cannot be a substitute for living.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Everything is changing, including yourself and the whole universe [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: All things are changing; and you yourself are in continuous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction, and the whole universe too.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 9.19)
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Nothing is evil which is according to nature [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: Nothing is evil which is according to nature.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.17)
     A reaction: A bit hopeful. Sounds tautological. I.e. anything which is agreed to be evil is probably immediately labelled as 'unnatural'. What would he agree was evil?
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
Justice has no virtue opposed to it, but pleasure has temperance opposed to it [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to pleasure, and that is temperance.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 8.39)
     A reaction: There are plenty of hideous things opposed to justice, but presumably that immediately disqualifies them from being virtues.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: The art of life is more like the wrestler's than the dancer's.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 7.61)
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Humans are naturally made for co-operation [Aurelius]
     Full Idea: We are made for cooperation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like the rows of upper and lower teeth. To act against one another, then, is contrary to nature.
     From: Marcus Aurelius (The Meditations (To Himself) [c.170], 2.1)
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Mendeleev saw three principles in nature: matter, force and spirit (where the latter seems to be essence) [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
     Full Idea: Mendeleev rejected one unifying principles in favour of three basic components of nature: matter (substance), force (energy), and spirit (soul). 'Spirit' is said to be what we now mean by essentialism - what is irreducibly peculiar to the object.
     From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 2. Modern Elements
Elements don't survive in compounds, but the 'substance' of the element does [Mendeleev]
     Full Idea: Neither mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in mercury oxide; it only contains the substance of the elements, just as steam only contains the substance of ice.
     From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870], I:23), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Nature'
     A reaction: [1889 edn] Scerri glosses the word 'substance' as meaning essence.
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Mendeleev focused on abstract elements, not simple substances, so he got to their essence [Mendeleev, by Scerri]
     Full Idea: Because he was attempting to classify abstract elements, not simple substances, Mendeleev was not misled by nonessential chemical properties.
     From: report of Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]) by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
     A reaction: I'm not fully clear about this, but I take it that Mendeleev stood back from the messy observations, and tried to see the underlying simpler principles. 'Simple substances' were ones that had not so far been decomposed.
Mendeleev had a view of elements which allowed him to overlook some conflicting observations [Mendeleev]
     Full Idea: His view of elements allowed Mendeleev to maintain the validity of the periodic table even in instances where observational evidence seemed to point against it.
     From: Dmitri Mendeleev (The Principles of Chemistry [1870]), quoted by Eric R. Scerri - The Periodic Table 04 'Making'
     A reaction: Mendeleev seems to have focused on abstract essences of elements, rather than on the simplest substances they had so far managed to isolate.