Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, M Loux / D Zimmerman and DH Mellor / T Crane

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8 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

9217	Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
	Full Idea: The empiricist revival of metaphysics came with Quine, who focused on ontological commitments associated with accepting a body of discourse, and Strawson, asking about the presuppositions of our conceptual practices.
	From: M Loux / D Zimmerman (Intro to Oxford Hndbk of Metaphysics [2003])
	A reaction: I find myself preferring the British approach. I can discourse about things without ontological commitment, and utter truths about non-existent things. I really yearn, though, for the third way - actually reasoning towards knowing what's out there.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox

6007	If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

6006	If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')

6008	Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism

7855	Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm.
	From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1
	A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere.

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation

6120	Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194)
	A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north?

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism

6121	There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198)
	A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist.

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique

6122	No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
	Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science.
	From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203)
	A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist?