Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Joseph Levine and Cian Dorr

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9 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox

6007	If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

6006	If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')

6008	Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta

14596	Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Just as there are no numbers or properties, there are no relations (like 'being heavier than' or 'betweenness'), or sets. I will provisionally use 'nominalism' for the conjunction of these four claims.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 1)
	A reaction: If you are going to be a nominalist, do it properly! My starting point in metaphysics is strong sympathy with this view. Right now [Tues 22nd Nov 2011, 10:57 am GMT] I think it is correct.

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

14597	Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]
	Full Idea: Natural Class Nominalists take as primitive the notion of a 'natural' class - a class of things that all resemble one another in some one respect and resemble nothing else in that respect.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: Dorr rejects this view because he doesn't believe in 'classes'. How committed to classes do you have to be before you are permitted to talk about them? All vocabulary (such as 'resemble') seems metaphysically tainted in this area.

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

14598	Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr]
	Full Idea: If there are abstract objects, there are necessary truths about these things that cannot be reduced to truths of logic. So only the nominalist, who denies that there are any such things, can adequately respect the idea that there are no brute necessities.
	From: Cian Dorr (There Are No Abstract Objects [2008], 4)
	A reaction: This is where two plates of my personal philosophy grind horribly against one another. I love nominalism, and I love natural necessities. They meet like a ring-species in evolution. I'll just call it a 'paradox', and move on (swiftly).

17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap

7876	Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Materialists identify pain with the firing of nociceptive-specific neurons in the parietal cortex. Even so, Levine argues, we will still lack any explanation of why nociceptive-specific neurons yield pain.
	From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
	A reaction: [Proposed by Levine in 1983] I don't think we need to instantly go dualist when faced with this, but we may all eventually have to concede a bit of mysterianism. The explanation may be holistic (and hence hopelessly complex).

7877	Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau]
	Full Idea: Levine says the explanatory gap is peculiar to phenomenal states. Once water has been identified with H2O, or temperature with mean kinetic energy, we do not continue to ask why H2O yields water, or why mean kinetic energy yields temperature.
	From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
	A reaction: Everything is mysterious if you think about if for long enough. What about a representational gap? Why do those neurons represent that tree (if the neurons aren't tree-shaped)? To understand qualia, we must understand the whole brain, I suspect.

7878	Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine]
	Full Idea: We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science.
	From: comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
	A reaction: I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first.