Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Friedrich Schiller and A.R. Lacey

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
     Full Idea: One possibility is that talk of sense-data is a mere linguistic convenience, providing a noun for talking about appearances, as when seeing a red object in sodium light (when it looks grey).
     From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
     A reaction: The term seems to have been coined to deal with situations where there is a gap between appearance and presumed reality, as in illusions. Maybe illusions prove the existence of sense-data, rather than it being a 'convenient' term.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
     Full Idea: It is hard to individuate sense-data, saying where one ends and the next begins, and hard to say whether they can change; are they substances, qualities, events, or what?
     From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
     A reaction: The problem is not that these questions are unanswerable. The answer seems to be either that they are physical and external, or that they are mental and internal, and that there is no ontological space for them between the two.
Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
     Full Idea: Sometimes it is said that sense-data are public, and parts either of objects or of the surfaces of objects.
     From: A.R. Lacey (A Dictionary of Philosophy [1976], p.196)
     A reaction: This suggests two drastically different theories, one making sense-data into mental events, the other placing them in the 'external' world. The latter theory can dovetail them with the physics, but then why would we need them?
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Beauty motivates morality, by harmonising feeling and reason [Schiller, by Pinkard]
     Full Idea: On Schiller's view, only beauty could shape or evince the necessary harmony between sensibility and reason (between inclination and duty) which provides the crucial motivation for the moral life.
     From: report of Friedrich Schiller (works [1794]) by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06
     A reaction: Maybe. Reason should probably be drawn towards feelings which seem inspiring.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Schiller speaks obsessively of freedom throughout his works [Schiller, by Berlin]
     Full Idea: Schiller constantly speaks of spiritual freedom: freedom of reason, the kingdom of freedom, our free self, inner freedom, freedom of mind, moral freedom, the free intelligence - a very favourite phrase - holy freedom, the impregnable citadel of freedom.
     From: report of Friedrich Schiller (works [1794]) by Isaiah Berlin - The Roots of Romanticism
     A reaction: Kant's philosophy and his Kingdom of Ends are an obvious source for this, but I trace the sentiment back to 'Freeborn John' Lilburne during the English Civil War. The English, thanks to Voltaire, embodied freedom in the Enlightenment.