Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eubulides, Francis of Marchia and Hecato

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5 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox

6007	If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox

6006	If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The liar paradox of Eubulides says 'if you state that you are lying, and state the truth, then you are lying'.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.95) Don't say it, then. These kind of paradoxes of self-reference eventually lead to Russell's 'barber' paradox and his Theory of Types.

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')

6008	Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
	Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
	From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
	A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

16627	If you remove the accidents from a horse and a lion, the intellect can't tell them apart [Francis of Marchia]
	Full Idea: Let all accidents be removed from a lion and a horse. Nothing remains in the intellect to distinguish them. We distinguish a lion and a horse only by analogy to the accidents proper to each. The intellect does not have an essential concept of either one.
	From: Francis of Marchia (Commentary on Sentences [1330], I.3.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.3
	A reaction: What a very nice thought experiment, and very convincing about how the mind perceives such things. But we don't believe horse and lion just consists of the surface properties of them which we experience.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues

6004	The cardinal virtues are theoretical (based on knowledge), and others are 'non-theoretical' [Hecato, by Dorandi]
	Full Idea: Hecato defined the cardinal virtues as 'theoretical', that is, based on knowledge, and to these he opposed those that are 'non-theoretical', for example, health, beauty, strength of spirit, and courage.
	From: report of Hecato (fragments/reports [c.70 BCE]) by Tiziano Dorandi - Hecato of Rhodes
	A reaction: Mostly these are Aristotle's external and non-external virtues, except that courage is here included among the former, implying, presumably, that it is more of a natural gift than an intellectual achievement.