12801
|
Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Coherentists try to provide an explication of epistemic rationality in terms of a set of deductive and probabilistic relations among beliefs and properties such as simplicity, conservativeness, and explanatory power.
|
|
From:
Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.317)
|
|
A reaction:
I have always like the coherentist view of justification, and now I see that this has led me to the question of explanation, which in turn has led me to essentialism. It's all coming together. Watch this space. 'Explanatory' is the key to everything!
|
6007
|
If you know your father, but don't recognise your father veiled, you know and don't know the same person [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
|
|
Full Idea:
The 'undetected' or 'veiled' paradox of Eubulides says: if you know your father, and don't know the veiled person before you, but that person is your father, you both know and don't know the same person.
|
|
From:
report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
|
|
A reaction:
Essentially an uninteresting equivocation on two senses of "know", but this paradox comes into its own when we try to give an account of how linguistic reference works. Frege's distinction of sense and reference tried to sort it out (Idea 4976).
|
6008
|
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
|
|
Full Idea:
The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
|
|
From:
report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
|
|
A reaction:
(also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
|
12800
|
Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley]
|
|
Full Idea:
Externalists are principally interested in understanding what knowledge is, ..while internalists, by contrast, are principally interested in explicating a sense of justification ..from one's own perspective.
|
|
From:
Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.314)
|
|
A reaction:
I find this very helpful, since I have a strong bias towards internalism (with a social dimension), and I see now that it is because I am more interested in what a (good) justification is than what some entity in reality called 'knowledge' consists of.
|
12802
|
We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is rare for pragmatic considerations to influence the rationality of our beliefs in the crass, direct way that Pascal's Wager envisions. Instead, they determine the direction and shape of our investigative and deliberative projects and practices.
|
|
From:
Richard Foley (Justified Belief as Responsible Belief [2005], p.320)
|
|
A reaction:
[See Idea 6684 for Pascal's Wager] Foley is evidently a full-blown pragmatist (which is bad), but this is nicely put. We can't deny the importance of the amount of effort put into an enquiry. Maybe it is an epistemic duty, rather than a means to an end.
|