27 ideas
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
| A reaction: This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms? |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
| A reaction: His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear. |
| 13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
| Full Idea: The laws of logic - which are constituted by atemporal thoughts and atemporal subject matter - provide universal prescriptions of how one ought to think, given that one's thinking has the function of attaining truth. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Knowing the Third Realm [1992], p.316) | |
| A reaction: Burge is giving, and endorsing, Frege's view. Burge is fighting a rearguard action, when logical systems keep proliferating. See Idea 10282. I sympathise with the dream of Burge and Frege. |
| 8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
| Full Idea: The second half of the twentieth century has seen the development of a vastly more sophisticated sense of logical form, as applied to natural languages. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.462) | |
| A reaction: Burge cites this as one of the three big modern developments (along with the critique of logical positivism, and direct reference/anti-individualism). Vagueness may be the last frontier for this development. |
| 17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
| Full Idea: A deeper justification for believing in [mathematical] propositions [apart from pragmatism] lies in finding their place in a logicist proof structure, by understanding the grounds within this structure that support them. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Knowing the Foundations [1998], 3) | |
| A reaction: This generalises to doubting something until you see what grounds it. |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Geometrical concepts appear to depend in some way on a spatial ability. Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of the propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a widely held view nowadays. Giaquinto has a book on it. A successful model of something can't replace it. Set theory can't replace arithmetic. |
| 9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Although one can translate geometrical propositions into algebraic ones and produce equivalent models, the meaning of geometrical propositions seems to me to be thereby lost. Pure geometry involves spatial content, even if abstracted from physical space. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority [2000], IV) | |
| A reaction: This supports Frege's view (against Quine) that geometry won't easily fit into the programme of logicism. I agree with Burge. You would be focusing on the syntax of geometry, and leaving out the semantics. |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| Full Idea: In the Peano axiomatisation, arithmetic seems primitively to involve the thought that 0 is a number. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 5) | |
| A reaction: Burge is pointing this out as a problem for Frege, for whom only the logic is primitive. |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: True statements about the necessary properties of things need not be necessarily true. The well-known example is that the number of planets (9) is necessarily an odd number. The necessity is de re, but not de dicto. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Nat.Internal') | |
| A reaction: This would be a matter of the scope (the placing of the brackets) of the 'necessarily' operator in a formula. The quick course in modal logic should eradicate errors of this kind in your budding philosopher. |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
| A reaction: This is why I do not think animals 'know' anything, though they seem to have lots of true beliefs about their immediate situation. |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Whereas Leibniz and Frege predicate apriority primarily of truths (or more fundamentally, proofs of truths), Kant predicates apriority primarily of cognition and the employment of representations. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Frege on Apriority (with ps) [2000], 1) |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: When we ask whether a belief is justified, we want to know whether it is all right to believe it. The question we must ask is 'when is it permissible (epistemically) to believe P?'. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |
| A reaction: Nice to see someone trying to get the question clear. The question clearly points to the fact that there must at least be some sort of social aspect to criteria of justification. I can't cheerfully follow my intuitions if everyone else laughs at them. |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Epistemologists have noted that logical entailments do not always constitute reasons. P may entail Q without the connection between P and Q being at all obvious. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
| A reaction: Graham Priest and others try to develop 'relevance logic' to deal with this. This would deny the peculiar classical claim that everything is entailed by a falsehood. A belief looks promising if it entails lots of truths about the world. |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Epistemic norms are to be understood in terms of procedural knowledge involving internalized rules for reasoning. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |
| A reaction: He offers analogies with bicycly riding, but the simple fact that something is internalized doesn't make it a norm. Some mention of truth is needed, equivalent to 'don't crash the bike'. |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: When one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of a perceptual state, I want to say that the perceptual state itself is one's reason. ..Reason are always reasons for beliefs, but the reasons themselves need not be beliefs. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Dir.Realism') | |
| A reaction: A crucial issue. I think I prefer the view of Davidson, in Ideas 8801 and 8804. Three options: a pure perception counts as a reason, or perceptions involve some conceptual content, or you only acquire a reason when a proposition is formulated. |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: If we had to make explicit appeal to epistemic norms for justification (the 'intellectualist model') we would find ourselves in an infinite regress. The norms, their existence and their application would themselves have to be justified. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |
| A reaction: This is counter to the 'space of reasons' picture, where everything is rationally assessed. There are regresses for both reasons and for experiences, when they are offered as justifications. |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Norm Externalism acknowledges that the content of our epistemic norms must be internalist, but employs external considerations in the selection of the norms themselves. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |
| A reaction: It can't be right that you just set your own norms, so this must contain some truth. Equally, even the most hardened externalist can't deny that what goes on in the head of the person concerned must have some relevance. |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view in discussing epistemology. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
| A reaction: Pollock's point, quite reasonably, is that the first-person aspect must precede any objective assessment of whether someone knows. External facts, such as unpublicised information, can undermine high quality internal justification. |
| 9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
| Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III | |
| A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good. |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| Full Idea: External considerations of reliability could not be internalized. Consequently, it is in principle impossible for us to actually employ externalist norms. I take this to be a conclusive refutation of belief externalism. | |
| From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
| A reaction: Not so fast. He earlier rejected the 'intellectualist model' (Idea 8813), so he doesn't think norms have to be fully conscious and open to criticism. So they could be innate, or the result of indoctrination (sorry, teaching), or just forgotten. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Anti-individualism is the view that not all of an individual's mental states and events can be type-individuated independently of the nature of the entities in the individual's physical or social environment environment. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.453) | |
| A reaction: While the Twin Earth experiment emphasises the physical environment, Burge has been responsible for emphasising the social environment. The suspicion is that the whole concept of 'individual' minds will collapse on this view. |
| 8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
| Full Idea: Certain thought experiments made trouble for standard functionalism, which limits input/output to the surface of an individual; proposals to extend this into the environment reduces the reliance on a computer paradigm, but increases complexity. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.454) | |
| A reaction: [He has the Twin Earth experiment in mind] The jury is out on this, but it looks a bit of a slippery slope. Accounts of action and responsibility need a fairly sharp concept of an individual. Externalism begins to look like just a new scepticism. |
| 8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
| Full Idea: The idea of anti-individualism raised problems about self-knowledge. The question is whether anti-individualism is compatible with some sort of authoritative or privileged warrant for certain types of self-knowledge. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.457) | |
| A reaction: [See under 'Nature of Minds' for 'Anti-individualism'] The thought is that if your mind is not entirely in your head, you can no longer be an expert on it. It might go the other way: obviously we can be self-experts, so anti-individualism is wrong. |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| Full Idea: There appear to be qualitative aspects of experience that have no function in the life of the organism. They constitute dysfunction or noise. Blurriness in a visual experience is an example. | |
| From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.460) | |
| A reaction: The best account of blurred vision would seem to be adverbial - I see 'in a blurred way' (nay, blurredly). Hence maybe blurred vision is functional, but it just isn't functioning very well. |
| 3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
| Full Idea: It is Burge's view that what a word means should be distinguished from the concept it expresses. | |
| From: report of Tyler Burge (Frege on Extensions from Concepts [1984]) by Gabriel M.A. Segal - A Slim Book about Narrow Content 3.2 | |
| A reaction: Presumably the immediate meaning (e.g. of 'arthritis') is socially determined, while the concept is fixed by history? Or what? |
| 14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |
| Full Idea: Bird argues that there are no finks at the fundamental level, and unlikely to be any antidotes. It then follows that laws at the fundamental level will all be strict - not ceteris paribus - laws. | |
| From: report of Tyler Burge (Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind [1986]) by Richard Corry - Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? 3 | |
| A reaction: [Bird's main target is Nancy Cartwright 1999] This is a nice line of argument. Isn't part of the ceteris paribus problem that two fundamental laws might interfere with one another? |