Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxarchus, Tom Milsted and Godfrey Vesey

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3 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
6457 Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey]
     Full Idea: Whereas a sensation is by definition mental, a sense-datum might be mind-independent.
     From: Godfrey Vesey (Collins Dictionary of Philosophy [1990], p.266)
     A reaction: This seems to be what Russell is getting at in 1912, as he clearly separates sense-data from sensations. Discussions of sense-data always assume they are mental, which may make them redundant - but so might making them physical.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
3061 Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing.
     From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]
     Full Idea: 'Grue' is not a colour.
     From: Tom Milsted (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This simple observation strikes me as rather crucial in assessing Goodman's paradox. Blue is a colour, but grue is some sort of behaviour. Blue is a secondary quality, but grue seems to be a primary quality.