4 ideas
17962 | The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest] |
Full Idea: Item x is said to be a sufficient truth-maker for truth-bearer p just in case necessarily if x exists then p is true. ...Every truth has a sufficient truth-maker. Hence, I take it, the sum of all sufficient truth-makers is a universal truth-maker. | |
From: Peter Forrest (General Facts,Phys Necessity, and Metaph of Time [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: Note that it is not 'necessary', because something else might make p true instead. |
15432 | Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis] |
Full Idea: Forrest proposed that structural universals should serve as ersatz possible worlds. | |
From: report of Peter Forrest (Ways Worlds Could Be [1986]) by David Lewis - Against Structural Universals 'Intro' | |
A reaction: I prefer powers to property universals. Perhaps a possible world is a maximal set of co-existing dispositions? |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
22251 | Liberalism may fail because it neglects the shared nature of what we pursue and protect [Haldane] |
Full Idea: I am interested in the claim that liberalism fails inasmuch as it neglects, and cannot accommodate, the fact that some or all of the goods we pursue, and which a system of rights is concerned to protect, are goods possessed in common. | |
From: John Haldane (The Individual, the State, and the Common Good [1996], III) | |
A reaction: It depends how individualistic we take liberalism to be. Extreme individualism (Nozick) strikes me as crazy. If 'we' erect a statue to some dubious politicians, it might be presented as a common good, but actually be despised by many. |