13 ideas
| 10414 | Abstract objects are constituted by encoded collections of properties [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
| Full Idea: In Zalta's view abstract objects are correlated with collections of properties. ..They encode, as well as exemplify, properties; indeed, an abstract object (such as a Euclidean triangle) is constituted by the properties it encodes. | |
| From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties 6.3 | |
| A reaction: If we are going to explain abstract objects with properties, then properties had better not be abstract objects. Zalta has a promising idea if we start from a nominalist and naturalistic view of properties (built from physical powers). 'Encode'? |
| 10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
| Full Idea: Where for ordinary objects one can discover the properties they exemplify, abstract objects are actually constituted or determined by the properties by which we conceive them. I use the technical term 'x encodes F' for this idea. | |
| From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], 2 n2) | |
| A reaction: One might say that whereas concrete objects can be dubbed (in the Kripke manner), abstract objects can only be referred to by descriptions. See 10557 for more technicalities about Zalta's idea. |
| 10415 | Properties make round squares and round triangles distinct, unlike exemplification [Zalta, by Swoyer] |
| Full Idea: On Zalta's view, properties with the same encoding extensions are identical, but may be distinct with the same exemplification extension. So the properties of being a round square and a round triangle are distinct, but with the same exemplification. | |
| From: report of Edward N. Zalta (Abstract Objects:intro to Axiomatic Metaphysics [1983]) by Chris Swoyer - Properties | |
| A reaction: (For Zalta's view, see Idea 10414) I'm not sure about 'encoding' (cf. Hodes's use of the word), but the idea that an abstract object is just a bunch of possible properties (assuming properties have prior availability) seems promising. |
| 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
| Full Idea: There is a convincing claim that we need to leave behind Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that as being too simplistic. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: [John Campbell is mentioned as source of this idea] I find this proposal immediately appealing. I was taught that riding a bicycle shows the division, as hardly anyone knows the theory, but I am sure children need some propositional information. |
| 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Three forms of (cognitive) direct realism are: two stages - non-conceptual sensory experience, then a non-sensory conceptual state; directly acquiring non-sensuous conceptual states; and sensuous states saturated with concepts. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 3) | |
| A reaction: [First: Reid, Dretske, Evans, Sellars. Second: Armstrong, Heil, Pitcher, Clark. Third: Kant, McDowell, Strawson, McGinn, Searle]. I find the first one plausible, because of the ambiguity in language, and because unusual experiences separate them. |
| 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (to serve as foundations on which the edifice of knowledge is to be constructed), and a metaphysical purpose (to provide an accurate account of the phenomenology of perceptual experience). | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 6) | |
| A reaction: This is very important, because there is a real danger (e.g. in Russell) that the epistemological convenience of sense-data for giving reliability in knowledge means that we are too quick in making the assumption that they actually exist. |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The representationalist/intentionalist thesis about perception is that we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience in normal perception; we are instead aware of those objects and their qualities that are specified in the content. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 9) | |
| A reaction: If secondary qualities are in the mind, not in objects, how come people always thought they were in objects? Answer: because this thesis is right? The primary mode of the mind is projected outwards, though we can introspect about colours. [Dretske] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The so-called 'myth of the given' is the view that conceptual content can be rationally supported by experiences construed as states with non-conceptual content. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The myth is attacked by Sellars and McDowell, the latter claiming that concepts must be embedded in the experiences. Maybe only realism is required to make the Given work. The experiences are definitely of something, and off we go... |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysically, mountains are only adverbial modifications of the Earth's belt. They have no existence independent of being part of the earth. Yet for all that, they have some rather strong 'object'-characteristics. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: The point being that you don't give up all the advantages of a sense-data view if you switch to adverbialism. I'm not convinced by the analogy, but we can only be aware of adverbial qualities if they have causal powers. |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |
| Full Idea: The two primary motivations of the adverbialist analysis are thought to be to avoid commitment to sensory particulars such as sense-data, and to allow us to hold on to a version of direct realism. | |
| From: Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10) | |
| A reaction: Maund says that the adverbialist's fears about indirect/representative theories are unfounded. My feeling is that neither account will do the job properly once we get a better account of consciousness. Maybe adverbialism is only for secondary qualities. |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| Full Idea: Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing. | |
| From: report of Anaxarchus (fragments/reports [c.340 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.10.1 |
| 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
| Full Idea: The content of thought can either be expressed as satisfaction conditions (e.g. truth-conditions for beliefs), or as the exercise of at least two concepts. | |
| From: report of Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 8) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: I think I favour the first view, because not all conjunctions of concepts would count as thoughts (e.g. rhubarb-plus-contradiction). A bunch of concepts becomes a thought when it connects in some way to reality? |
| 10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
| Full Idea: My object theory is formulated in a 'syntactically second-order' modal predicate calculus modified only so as to admit a second kind of atomic formula ('xF'), which asserts that object x 'encodes' property F. | |
| From: Edward N. Zalta (Deriving Kripkean Claims with Abstract Objects [2006], p.2) | |
| A reaction: This is summarising Zalta's 1983 theory of abstract objects. See Idea 10558 for Zalta's idea in plain English. |