Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, David Liggins and Kit Fine
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10 ideas
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
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13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
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14267
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There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
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14264
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Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
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13326
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A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
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13327
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A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
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14233
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Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
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13329
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An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
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13330
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An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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12887
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A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
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13328
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Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
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