Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) and Saul A. Kripke

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26 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke]
De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett]
Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames]
An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins]
Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G]
Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke]
Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke]
If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]