Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Ruth Barcan Marcus and Jean Buridan
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10 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
10796
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If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
11181
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Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11184
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Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16678
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Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11180
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Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11186
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'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)]
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11185
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'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
11182
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If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
16793
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A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
10797
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Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)]
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