Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM, Peter van Inwagen and Francisco Surez

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32 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
17556 Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen]
8264 Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
17565 Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen]
14228 If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen]
14468 Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
17571 Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16667 Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17562 The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen]
17574 If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
17007 Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
16780 Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
16758 The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
17531 I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16743 We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
17560 If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
17561 If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
17566 I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen]
14230 We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
17557 Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
13074 Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
17564 The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
17575 The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
16742 We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
17577 When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
17589 If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
22143 Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
22144 Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
22146 Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
22145 Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
22147 Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
22148 Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
17588 We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen]