Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Amie L. Thomasson and Kathrin Koslicki

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31 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
14485 Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson]
14487 The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
21651 It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber]
14486 Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson]
14467 Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson]
14479 To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
14495 I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki]
13264 If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki]
24065 Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14481 Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14497 The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki]
13280 Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki]
14482 If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson]
14483 Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
24066 The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
14496 Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14498 For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki]
13283 The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13266 Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
14500 Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
13281 Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
24067 Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14476 Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson]
14477 Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson]