Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Eubulides, Andr Gallois and C.B. Martin
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13 ideas
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
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A CAR and its major PART can become identical, yet seem to have different properties [Gallois]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
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Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB]
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Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
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I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
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Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
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Gallois hoped to clarify identity through time, but seems to make talk of it impossible [Hawley on Gallois]
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16025
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If things change they become different - but then no one thing undergoes the change! [Gallois]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
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4D: time is space-like; a thing is its history; past and future are real; or things extend in time [Gallois]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
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Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB]
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15475
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The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
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Gallois is committed to identity with respect to times, and denial of simple identity [Gallois, by Sider]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
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Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley]
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16027
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If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois]
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