Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Anaxarchus, Henry of Ghent and Kit Fine
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44 ideas
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
9202
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Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
15075
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Modal features are not part of entities, because they are accounted for by the entity [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / c. Unity as conceptual
14252
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We should understand identity in terms of the propositions it renders true [Fine,K]
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13332
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Hierarchical set membership models objects better than the subset or aggregate relations do [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9769
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Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
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23545
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We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
13333
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The matter is a relatively unstructured version of the object, like a set without membership structure [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267
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There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
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14264
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Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
13326
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A 'temporary' part is a part at one time, but may not be at another, like a carburetor [Fine,K]
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13327
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A 'timeless' part just is a part, not a part at some time; some atoms are timeless parts of a water molecule [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
13329
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An 'aggregative' sum is spread in time, and exists whenever a component exists [Fine,K]
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13330
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An 'compound' sum is not spread in time, and only exists when all the components exists [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
13328
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Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11177
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Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14256
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How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
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11152
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Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
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14258
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Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11173
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Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
11179
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If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
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14260
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An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161
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Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
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15065
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What it is is fixed prior to existence or the object's worldly features [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160
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Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
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11158
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Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167
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Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
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16537
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Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
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11163
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The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
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11164
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It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
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9206
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We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935
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An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
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9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936
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Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
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15076
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Essential features of an object have no relation to how things actually are [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
12295
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3-D says things are stretched in space but not in time, and entire at a time but not at a location [Fine,K]
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12298
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Genuine motion, rather than variation of position, requires the 'entire presence' of the object [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
12296
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4-D says things are stretched in space and in time, and not entire at a time or at a location [Fine,K]
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18882
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You can ask when the wedding was, but not (usually) when the bride was [Fine,K, by Simons]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
12297
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Three-dimensionalist can accept temporal parts, as things enduring only for an instant [Fine,K]
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17279
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Even a three-dimensionalist might identify temporal parts, in their thinking [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165
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If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
15603
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I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
15073
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Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
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15604
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If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]
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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
15074
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We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K]
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