Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, Stephen Mumford and J Ladyman / D Ross

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31 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
14926 Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross]
14929 A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
14925 The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 3. Structural Relations
14931 That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
14333 Dispositions and categorical properties are two modes of presentation of the same thing [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
14932 Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14336 Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
14315 Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
14332 There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
14302 A lead molecule is not leaden, and macroscopic properties need not be microscopically present [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
9446 Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford]
14294 Dispositions are attacked as mere regularities of events, or place-holders for unknown properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14310 Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
14317 I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
14316 If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
14313 All properties must be causal powers (since they wouldn't exist otherwise) [Mumford]
14318 Intrinsic properties are just causal powers, and identifying a property as causal is then analytic [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14293 Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
14326 Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
14298 Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
14314 If dispositions are powers, background conditions makes it hard to say what they do [Mumford]
14325 Maybe dispositions can replace powers in metaphysics, as what induces property change [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
14312 Orthodoxy says dispositions entail conditionals (rather than being equivalent to them) [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / e. Dispositions as potential
14291 Dispositions are not just possibilities - they are features of actual things [Mumford]
14299 There could be dispositions that are never manifested [Mumford]
14920 If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
14323 If every event has a cause, it is easy to invent a power to explain each case [Mumford]
14328 Traditional powers initiate change, but are mysterious between those changes [Mumford]
14331 Categorical eliminativists say there are no dispositions, just categorical states or mechanisms [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
9435 A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]