Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Rescher,N/Oppenheim,P, David M. Armstrong and Richard Hooker

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

54 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
17691 Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
17679 All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
15550 Properties are contingently existing beings with multiple locations in space and time [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
18372 We need properties, as minimal truthmakers for the truths about objects [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
18379 The determinates of a determinable must be incompatible with each other [Armstrong]
18378 Length is a 'determinable' property, and one mile is one its 'determinates' [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
12677 Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
4445 If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
18400 Properties are not powers - they just have powers [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
17666 Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
17667 Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
17687 If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
18397 Powers must result in some non-powers, or there would only be potential without result [Armstrong]
18399 How does the power of gravity know the distance it acts over? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
4032 The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong]
17669 Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
17686 Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
17677 Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
15442 Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
4446 It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / c. Self-predication
4442 Most thinkers now reject self-predication (whiteness is NOT white) so there is no Third Man problem [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
8505 Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
4431 'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
4433 Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
4432 'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
4437 'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
4438 'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]