Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, Willard Quine and John Dewey

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these philosophers

display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers

25 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
7925 There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
9017 Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
18439 Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
14296 Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
15723 Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
16948 Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15490 Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB]
16945 We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
9006 Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4443 Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
11099 Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
11094 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine]
11097 Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine]