Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Herodotus, John Locke and David Lewis

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53 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis]
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis]
9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider]
15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis]
15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis]
15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis]
15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis]
15400 We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron]
15458 A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis]
15459 Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis]
15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis]
10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis]
15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis]
15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis]
15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis]
16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin]
15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis]
15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron]
15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis]
15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis]
15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis]
15516 A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis]
16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis]
9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]