Combining Philosophers
Ideas for Herodotus, Dag Prawitz and Brian Ellis
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13 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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13584
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The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
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5468
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Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
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13587
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There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
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12673
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Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
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13577
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Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
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9436
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The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
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5469
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The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
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12665
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I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
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12682
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Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
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12684
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Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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13582
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'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
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12672
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Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
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5456
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Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
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