Combining Philosophers
Ideas for H.Putnam/P.Oppenheim, Stuart Hampshire and Willard Quine
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9 ideas
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
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The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
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Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
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Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
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7925
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There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine]
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10295
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Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
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8479
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Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
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9017
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Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine]
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18439
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Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine]
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3322
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Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
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